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ABSTRACT 
Chris Michael Foster: The effect of domain general age-related cognitive changes on the pattern 
completion bias and episodic memory 
(Under the direction of Kelly S. Giovanello) 
Several prominent theories have been developed to account for changes in cognition that 
occur with age, and most of these theories focus upon age-related impairments in domain-general 
cognitive processes, such as processing speed, cognitive resources, and inhibitory functions. 
However, a relatively new theory has been put forth to account for age-related changes that are 
specific to episodic memory. The pattern completion bias (PCB) in aging theory suggests that 
older adults are biased to generalize a novel but similar representation (i.e., pattern complete) as 
opposed to creating a distinct representation (i.e., pattern separate). It has yet to be tested 
whether domain-general theories of cognitive aging may account for, or alter, the PCB in aging. 
To this end, the current dissertation project consisted of three experiments, each manipulating the 
study phase of the mnemonic similarity task, to assess the contribution of cognitive slowing 
(Experiment 1), reductions in cognitive resources (Experiment 2), and reduced inhibitory 
function (Experiment 3) to the age-related PCB. Regardless of the manipulation at encoding, the 
test phase consisted of recognition judgments regarding whether the object was a repetition of a 
previously seen object, a rotated version of a previously seen object, or a novel object. 
Successful pattern separation was measured as the ability to correctly recognize that an object 
was rotated at test, as compared to the orientation presented at study. The results indicate that 
processing speed and inhibitory function are contributors to the PCB in aging. However, 
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although attentional resources are critical for the formation of complex memories, there was 
limited evidence to support the hypothesis that attentional resources contribute to the pattern 
completion bias. The current set of experiments provide novel support for the notion that pattern 
separation processes are altered by a variety of domain-general processes that change with age. 
Therefore, the mnemonic similarity task, thought to specifically tax pattern separation, captures 
domain-general processes as well as pattern separation processes. Future research should modify 
the mnemonic similarity task to account for domain-general cognitive aging processes, as well as 
investigate the neural underpinnings of older adult improvements on the task when these 
accommodations are considered.
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Chapter 1: Cognitive Aging 
1.1 Introduction 
Changes in cognition occur in all individuals as they age. These changes may take many 
forms; however, it is common to see impairments in perception, attention, processing speed, 
episodic memory, and working memory (Craik & Salthouse, 2008). While many aspects of 
cognition change with age, memory complaints are the most frequently reported by older adults 
(OAs; Newson & Kemps, 2006). Several prominent theories have been developed to account for 
these changes, including a change in processing speed (Salthouse, 1996a; 1996b), reductions in 
cognitive resources (Craik, 1983; Craik & Byrd, 1982), and impairments in inhibitory processes 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1988; Lustig, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007; Zacks, Hasher, & Li, 2000). These 
theories are domain-general explanations of cognitive aging in that a single factor explains a 
wide variety of cognitive changes that occur in aging. A relatively new theory of cognitive aging, 
hereafter referred to as the pattern completion bias (PCB), has been put forth to account for age-
related episodic memory deficits. This theory posits that OAs, due to anatomical and functional 
changes within a medial temporal lobe brain structure called the hippocampus, are biased to 
pattern complete (PC; i.e., retrieve a pre-existing representation when exposed to a novel but 
similar representation) as opposed to pattern separate (PS; i.e., create a distinct representation 
even if it is similar to a stored representation). The PCB reflects an increase in the likelihood that 
OAs will indicate that a similar, but novel, representation is identical to a representation stored in 
memory (Toner, Pirogovsky, Kirwan, & Gilbert, 2009; Yassa & Stark, 2011; Yassa et al., 
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2011a). The current set of experiments tested a key tenet of the PCB theory of cognitive aging, 
namely, that the PCB in aging cannot be accounted for by manipulating features of the task (e.g., 
decision making time, strategy, etc.) that may differentially impact OA’s memory performance 
(Stark, Stevenson, Wu, Rutledge, & Stark, 2015). Despite this claim, very little research has been 
conducted that specifically addresses how domain-general theories of cognitive aging might 
moderate the PCB. I hypothesized that if age-related changes in domain-general processes are 
accounted for in an experimental design, then the PCB in aging will be reduced. Similarly, I 
hypothesized that young adults (YAs), when placed under certain experimental conditions, 
would also show a PCB. 
The domain-general theories of cognitive aging suggest that a primary reason for poorer 
memory performance in OAs is a reduction in the fidelity of the encoded memory representation. 
For example, the processing speed theory suggests that OAs either need more time to create a 
robust representation, or are unable to build the same quality of representation due to degradation 
of previously processed information over time (Salthouse, 1996). The resource deficit theory 
posits that OAs are less able to deploy an efficient strategy to encode a representation (Craik, 
1983). The inhibition deficit suggests that OAs are less able to maintain a clean mental 
workspace and, therefore, are more likely to encode (or be distracted by) irrelevant information, 
thereby reducing the quality of the goal relevant representation (Zacks et al., 2000). I 
hypothesized that domain-general aspects of aging would contribute to the PCB observed in 
OAs. 
Prior research investigating the PCB has focused primarily on the neural mechanisms that 
account for age-related changes in episodic memory. However, only one study has examined 
whether aspects of the memory task design may be able to moderate the PCB in OAs (Stark et 
4 
al., 2015). Stark et al. (2015) manipulated several aspects of the memory task (e.g., incidental 
versus intentional encoding, time at decision making, types of response options) and found that 
none of these task design changes ameliorated the PCB in aging. As such, Stark and colleagues 
(2015) conclude that, “these data support the notion that underlying changes in the brain 
circuitry, specifically within the hippocampus, cannot be overcome to improve performance on 
this task” (p. 14).  
To investigate whether domain-general aspects of cognitive aging may moderate the 
PCB, three experiments were conducted. Each experiment manipulated the study phase of an 
image-based memory task in order to assess the contribution of cognitive slowing (Experiment 
1), reductions in cognitive resources (Experiment 2), and reduced inhibitory function 
(Experiment 3) to the age-related PCB. Regardless of the manipulation at encoding, the test 
phase consisted of recognition judgments regarding whether the object was a repetition of a 
previously seen object, a rotated version of a previously seen object, or a novel object. Pattern 
separation and PC processes were measured as the ability to identify rotated objects at test. Each 
experiment manipulated one variable to assess its’ impact on the PCB observed in aging. If the 
PCB in aging can be reduced by any of the experimental manipulations, it would offer novel 
evidence that PS and PC processes are moderated by domain general cognitive processes. The 
current set of experiments provide an important step in building a more comprehensive 
understanding of the mechanisms that give rise to age-related alterations in episodic memory 
function. To begin, the prominent theories of cognitive aging are discussed, followed by a 
summary of episodic memory deficits as they relate to the PCB. Next, a description of each 
experiment is provided, including rationale, methods, and results.  This dissertation concludes 
with a discussion of the broad implications of the findings. 
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1.2 Domain general theories of cognitive aging  
1.2.1 Processing speed theory 
 One of the most pervasive and influential theories of cognitive aging is the processing 
speed theory (e.g., Salthouse, 1996a). This theory suggests that the rate at which information is 
processed slows as we age (proposed to be mediated by alterations in white matter integrity), and 
that this slowing of processing speed has downstream effects on essentially all aspects of 
cognition (Craik & Salthouse, 2008; Persson et al., 2006; Salthouse, 1996b). Importantly, such 
slowing is thought to be a general mechanism of age-related cognitive change since a variety of 
speed measures share significant variance with age, and the relationships are not moderated by 
health factors, experience, or practice (Salthouse, 1996a; 2000). Further, changes in a wide 
variety of cognitive processes including memory, reasoning, and spatial abilities are significantly 
mediated by measures of processing speed (Salthouse, 1996a). For example, Salthouse (1996b) 
investigated the relation between memory performance, age, and a general factor of processing 
speed. A significant amount of variance in recall memory performance was accounted for by age 
(.289 – variance in recall performance accounted for by age); however, after accounting for a 
general processing speed measure derived from a large number of tests proposed to measure 
processing speed, the variance in memory performance accounted for by age was dramatically 
reduced and no longer significant (.016 – variance in recall performance accounted for by age 
controlling for processing speed). Thus, while processing speed accounts for many changes in 
cognition that occur with age, it may specifically account for many of the age-related changes in 
episodic memory. 
Such age-related processing speed changes have been linked to white-matter health 
across the brain. For example, measures of white matter hyperintensities (i.e., a general measure 
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of white matter health) are correlated with motor speed (Soderlund et al., 2003). Fractional 
anisotropy (a measure of white matter integrity) has been shown to correlate with reaction times 
in a visual detection task (Madden et al., 2004) as well as other measures of processing speed 
(O’Sullivan, Jones, Summers, Morris, Williams, & Markus, 2001; Persson et al., 2006; Stebbins 
et al., 2001).  
The processing speed theory of aging is proposed to affect cognition primarily through 
two mechanisms, the limited time mechanism and the simultaneity mechanism (Salthouse, 
1996a). The limited time mechanism suggests that, due to OA’s slower processing speed, when a 
task has time constraints, OAs are not be able to complete all relevant cognitive operations 
required by the task, or at least not to the same extent as YAs. This could lead to a host of 
problems, but in the case of memory, it is likely that the encoded representation is not of the 
same strength or quality as YAs due to fewer features of the event being processed. The 
simultaneity mechanism suggests that the products of earlier operations are lost or degraded in 
OAs because of the extended time needed to complete each step of the cognitive process. 
Therefore, if a cognitive operation requires the combination of previously distinct processes 
(e.g., a multi-staged math problem where the product from an early operation in the problem 
needs to be held in mind and combined with the product from a later operation) then this 
combination would not occur as efficiently or, potentially, not at all. Again, in relation to 
memory phenomena, if an association is to be formed either within or between stimuli, it is likely 
that the to-be-encoded stimuli are not bound as efficiently in an integrated memory trace since 
the parts of the stimuli that are attended to early on may not be as robust when these features 
need to be bound to later attended aspects of the stimulus or event. 
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1.2.2 Resource deficit 
 Another prominent theory of cognitive aging is the resource deficit theory (e.g., Craik, 
1983, 1986; Craik & Byrd, 1982). In essence, this theory suggests that OAs have diminished 
processing resources in the form of reduced attentional or working memory capacity. Processing 
capacity refers to the idea that the mind has a finite pool of resources. As we engage in attention 
demanding tasks, that pool of resources is reduced, leaving fewer resources available to deploy 
to other information and cognitive tasks. Thus, if OAs’ have an overall reduction in the available 
pool of resources, all tasks will necessarily use a greater proportion of the available resources. A 
decrease in resources is thought to arise from a reduction in frontal lobe functioning (Craik, 
1983). Reduced resources impose restrictions on the ability to accomplish resource demanding 
tasks, including self-initiated encoding processes, generation of novel connections, and the use of 
strategic process that may improve encoding or retrieval (Zacks, Hasher, Li, 2000). If OAs use 
the same amount of resources as YAs during strategic processing, then there are fewer resources 
available to deploy to the to-be-encoded information. If, however, OAs use the same amount of 
resources as YAs to process the to-be-encoded information, then OAs have fewer resources 
available for strategic processes that may aid in the efficient encoding and retrieval of that 
representation. Essentially, if OAs have a reduction in available resources, all cognitively 
demanding tasks will necessarily be more difficult for OAs (Anderson, Craik, Naveh-Benjamin, 
1998). In the case of memory, OAs reduced resources lead to an impairment in the strength or 
quality of the encoded stimulus, or a reduced ability to strategically encode that stimulus, leading 
to worse memory performance overall. 
 Evidence for this theory comes from a wide variety of paradigms, each of which 
implement some measure of divided attention (e.g., Anderson et al., 1998; Craik & McDowd, 
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1987; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; Kim & Giovanello, 2011; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & 
Kreuger, 2005). For example, Anderson et al. (1998) required a group of YAs and OAs to 
encode words with no secondary task (i.e., during full attention) or while performing a secondary 
continuous reaction time task (i.e., divided attention). Again, the resource deficit theory posits 
that OAs have fewer resources than YAs, and thus, if YAs are engaged in a divided attention 
task, their performance on the primary task should mimic that of OAs (since there are fewer 
resources to devote to the primary task). Anderson et al.’s results showed that YAs exhibit a 
reduction in memory during divided attention that closely mimics that of OAs under full 
attention. Similarly, Naveh-Benjamin et al. (2005) asked participants to constantly track a 
stimulus presented on a screen with a computer mouse. Young adults in this study exhibited 
memory impairments when their attention was divided at encoding, as compared to the full 
attention condition; however, not to the extent of OAs. These results provide some evidence that 
the memory changes associated with aging reflect a reduction in the available attentional 
resources in OAs.  
Craik and McDowd (1987) also showed that OAs have a greater cost on secondary task 
performance during recall tasks, suggesting that OAs have fewer resources available when 
performing cognitive operations that support memory retrieval; however, secondary task costs 
are minimal during recognition as compared to free recall. In combination, these studies suggest 
that the reduction of attentional resources occurs during all stages of memory (e.g., encoding and 
retrieval) and that the reduction of attentional resources can account for many of the episodic 
memory changes associated with age.  
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1.2.3 Inhibition deficit 
 The inhibitory control deficit in aging primarily concerns the ability to manage the 
contents of working memory (Hasher & Zacks, 1988) and is thought to arise from reduced 
inhibitory control mechanisms supported by frontal lobe functioning (Jonides, Marshuetz, Smith, 
Reuter-Lorenz, Koeppe, & Hartley, 2000). Hasher and her colleagues have proposed three 
mechanisms by which the contents of working memory are controlled: Access, deletion, and 
restraint (Lustig, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007). Access refers to the ability to control what enters 
working memory. Access deficits in aging have been demonstrated in studies in which words are 
displayed on top of line drawings. Participants are told to ignore the words and identify the 
drawings. Older adults, relative to YAs, show later priming for the superimposed words, 
suggesting that OAs are less able to ignore the words (or at least prevent access of the words into 
working memory) during encoding (Rowe, Valderrama, Hasher, & Lenartwoicz, 2006; Kim, 
Hasher, & Zacks, 2007).  
Deletion refers to the ability to remove irrelevant information from working memory. 
Deleting information from working memory should occur if that information is no longer useful, 
if it accidentally entered working memory, or if it is interfering with other ongoing operations. 
Evidence for age-related alterations in the deletion function may be observed in working 
memory span studies and directed forgetting investigations. Typically, measures of working 
memory span increase in difficulty in a linear fashion when to-be-remembered lists get longer 
and longer with each trial. When these typical span measures are reversed, aging deficits are 
greatly reduced, suggesting that OAs have difficulty with proactive interference or deleting 
irrelevant information (Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001; May, Hasher, & Kane, 1999; Rowe, 
Hasher, & Turcotte, 2008). The deletion function has also been shown to be important for long 
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term memory. Directed forgetting experiments, experiments in which certain studied stimuli are 
directed to be remembered and other studied stimuli are directed to be forgotten, indicate that 
YAs are better able than OAs at suppressing previously encountered representations to aid in the 
efficient memory of the current, to-be-remembered representations (Zacks, Radvansky, & 
Hasher, 1996). 
Restraint refers to the ability to prevent pre-potent responses or representations from 
entering working memory when these processes are not goal relevant. May and Hasher (1998) 
provided evidence for impairments in the restraint mechanism by instructing participants to stop 
responding intermittently on a category verification task (e.g., respond “yes” when an exemplar 
was part of the category word and “no” when it was not). Older adults were just as accurate 
during the response portion of the task, but much more likely to make errors when they, as 
compared to YAs, were supposed to withhold a response. In sum, OAs are less capable of 
controlling what enters the contents of, and stays within, working memory. The aforementioned 
inhibitory mechanisms are important for preventing “mental clutter”, such that the information 
that is maintained in mind during a task is related only to the goals of the current task. 
1.3 The pattern completion bias in aging 
The cognitive aging theories discussed thus far are domain-general theories, in that they 
account for age-related changes in a wide array of cognitive domains with a single process. As 
described above, these global changes in cognition have a clear and measurable impact on 
memory; however, this impact arises from upstream effects on what is processed and, therefore, 
remembered. For example, if processing speed is reduced, time constraints will impact what 
aspects of the environment are processed. This could affect the deployment of attention, the 
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quality of processing that occurs during encoding, the type of processes that can be executed at 
decision making, or the rate at which prior knowledge can be accessed and used strategically. 
Despite the variety of global changes in cognition that occur with age, OAs report 
episodic memory changes, memories of the past that contain details of an event and its 
surrounding context, as their primary complaint (Newson & Kemps, 2006; Tulving, 1972). 
While several theoretical distinctions in the memory literature have been created to explain the 
phenomenological aspects of episodic memories, as compared to memories that have no 
contextual details or are only expressed through behavior (e.g., declarative/non-declarative, 
implicit/explicit, recollection/familiarity), it is generally agreed upon that episodic memories 
require the hippocampus to be encoded and retrieved. The hippocampus is proposed to support 
episodic memory by aiding in the creation of an orthogonalized neural code, even when the to-
be-encoded representation is similar to one encountered in the past. The ability to create a novel 
code in the face of similarity is referred to as PS, while the ability to generalize degraded or 
partial information into a previously stored code is referred to as PC. Pattern separation and PC 
are critical for storing and retrieving episodic memories, as these processes prevent catastrophic 
interference from similar episodes (Yassa & Stark, 2011). Importantly, PS should not be thought 
of as encoding and PC should not be thought of as retrieval. Both PS and PC operate on a single 
stream of neural input. Therefore, both PS and PC contribute to a process of mnemonic 
discrimination such that the neural input is either made more distinct, or made more similar to 
previously encountered mnemonic representations. 
Recently, the notion has been put forth that age-related episodic memory deficits reflect a 
bias to PC, also known as representational rigidity (Yassa & Stark, 2011). In other words, when 
two events have overlapping details, OAs are biased to encode the similar, but new event, as the 
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same as a previously encountered (old) event. To this end, YAs would be more likely to encode a 
similar event as a new episode, while OAs would not. Further, the PCB in aging relies almost 
solely on functional and anatomical changes in the hippocampus to support the theory and its 
predictions. For example, OAs experience a significant reduction of input from the entorhinal 
cortex to the dentate gyrus/cornu amonis 3, a significant reduction in dentate gyrus volume, and 
an overall reduction in inhibitory interneurons throughout the hippocampus (Brickman et al., 
2011; Wilson, Gallagher, Eichenbaum, & Tanila, 2006). 
While the PCB in aging is mediated by age-related changes in the hippocampus, there is 
also a preponderance of behavioral evidence using the mnemonic similarity task (Kirwan & 
Stark, 2007) that support the PCB theory of cognitive aging (e.g., Holden, & Gilbert, 2012; Ly, 
Murray, & Yassa, 2013; Pidgeon, & Morcom, 2014; Yassa et al., 2011b; Yassa, & Stark, 2010; 
Reagh et al., 2014; Stark et al., 2013; Stark et al., 2015; Toner et al., 2009). The mnemonic 
similarity task is thought to tax PS processes due to the inclusion of repeated items, similar lures, 
and novel foils presented during the recognition portion of the experiment. Critically, the similar 
lures are crafted to create a range of similarity in which some lures are extremely similar to 
previously studied items and others are related, but dissimilar to previously studied items. Across 
this range of similarity, experimenters can assess how much novelty is needed before participants 
are able to recognize that an item is “similar”, but “new”. 
The mnemonic similarity task has consistently supported the idea that OAs require more 
novelty to store a similar episode as new. Toner et al. (2009) showed that OAs are more likely to 
indicate that a “similar” item is “old” as compared to YAs. Thus, OAs experience greater 
interference when distinguishing similar from old (repeated) trials. When looking across levels 
of similarity, Yassa et al. (2011b) showed that YAs perform similarly to OAs when the stimuli 
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are the most similar; however, as stimuli become less similar, YAs exhibit a more rapid 
improvement in the ability to say a “similar” trial is “similar” as compared to OAs. The fact that 
YAs ability to indicate a “similar” trial is “similar” improves more rapidly than OAs, confirms 
the prediction that OAs experience a bias to PC.  
Older adults’ PCB is also exemplified graphically by an altered “tuning curve” (see 
Figure 1A; Stark et al., 2013). The reduction in the initial steepness of the curve, as compared to 
YAs, shows that OAs require more novelty to indicate an object is “similar”. Importantly, the 
anchor points of the curve, the ability to indicate that an exact repeat is “old” and a new item is 
“new”, are typically around the same performance level (e.g., Toner et al., 2009; Stark et al., 
2013; Yassa et al., 2011b), though they are not always exactly the same (see Figure 1B; Stark et 
al., 2013). Concluding that OAs, or any group, have impairments in PS relies on differences in 
performance across the curve. Even if there are small deviations in the anchor (as can be seen in 
Figure 1B) the critical differences lay in how performance changes as similarity decreases. The 
PCB has been tested across several types of processing engaged during learning and memory, 
including spatial memory (Reagh et al., 2014; Stark, Yassa, & Stark, 2010), as well as perceptual 
and conceptual memory using both pictures (Pidgeon & Morcom, 2014) and words (Ly, Murray, 
Yassa, 2013). The range of memory tasks that have yielded similar results suggests that PS and 
PC processes are fundamental memory functions, and that the alteration of these processes with 
age underlies episodic memory functions, regardless of the type of processing or modality. 
Not only has the PCB in aging been assessed across several domains of learning and 
memory, several aspects of the mnemonic similarity task have been manipulated to determine 
whether the task design may contribute to the PCB in aging (Stark et al., 2015). Stark and 
colleagues (2015) manipulated the time given to make the memory judgement, intentionality of 
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encoding, as well as several other features of the task. They manipulated the time allowed for 
decision making under the assumption that processing speed changes at decision may bias OAs 
to choose old responses more so than YAs. Intentionality of encoding was also manipulated to 
assess whether part of the PCB in aging is the result of OAs and YAs differentially deploying 
attentional resources during incidental encoding. Regardless of the manipulation, OAs were 
consistently found to show impairments on the mnemonic similarity task and these impairments 
were not improved when taking into account the aforementioned aspects of the task design. 
The crux of the current proposal relies on a key feature of the PCB in aging. Namely, the 
PCB theory suggests that the episodic memory deficits that occur in aging reflect a mechanistic 
property of the hippocampus, such that the balance between PS and PC is altered by age via 
impaired functioning of the hippocampus. Based on a series of experiments that manipulated 
certain features of the mnemonic similarity task, Stark et al. (2015) conclude that OAs’ 
performance on the mnemonic similarity task cannot be improved; however, this study primarily 
focused on aspects of the task that may impact the decision making process. Further, the only 
manipulation implemented at encoding (intentional vs. incidental encoding) was used to assess 
whether OAs could improve their performance. Thus, there is an open question as to what 
manipulations at encoding, if any, may alter the PCB in aging. The Stark et al. (2015) study also 
leaves open the question of what manipulations would be necessary to cause YAs to perform like 
OAs.  
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Chapter 2: The current proposal 
2.1 The interaction of cognitive aging theories 
 Given the limited evidence to support the conclusion that OAs’ performance on the 
mnemonic similarity task cannot be improved, the current proposal tested the hypothesis that the 
PCB in aging can be moderated when experimentally controlling for domain-general processes 
that also change with age. Specifically, Experiment 1 manipulated time at encoding to assess the 
role of processing speed on the PCB. Experiment 2 implemented a divided attention task to 
assess the impact of attentional resources on the PCB, and Experiment 3 implemented a directed 
forgetting paradigm to assess the role of inhibition in the PCB. If the PCB in aging can be 
moderated by domain-general processes it would provide evidence that the mnemonic similarity 
task captures more aspects of cognitive aging than simply mnemonic changes. Further, if the 
PCB in aging can be moderated by domain-general processes, it would provide novel evidence 
that impairments to memory caused by hippocampal changes are exacerbated by cognitive 
processes thought to occur outside of the hippocampus. These results would offer new strategies 
by which OA memory impairments may be reduced, and open new avenues of research to 
understand the mechanisms that cause age related memory changes. In the following pages, the 
general procedures that are common to all experiments are outlined first, followed by a 
description of each experimental design, the results, and a discussion of the findings. The 
dissertation ends with a discussion of the broader implications of the findings.  
16 
2.2 General experimental procedures 
2.2.1 Participants.  
 Each experiment used a within subjects design and included approximately 50 subjects 
(25 YAs and 25 OAs). Young adults ranged in age from 18 – 27 years and were recruited from 
either the Psychology and Neuroscience 101 research participant pool at UNC Chapel Hill or 
through flyers displayed throughout the campus and surrounding areas. Older adults ranged in 
age from 60 – 86 years and were recruited through a participant database established within the 
Cognitive Neuroscience of Memory Laboratory, emails sent throughout the campus, flyers 
posted around campus, and flyers posted in the local community, including retirement 
communities and senior centers. All participants were screened for cognitive impairments using 
the Mini Mental State Exam (MMSE) and were required to score a 27 or higher to be included in 
the study (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975). None of the participants recruited for the 
reported experiments met these exclusionary criteria. 
Participants were also given several cognitive tests to obtain standardized measures of 
cognition. All participants completed the digit span forward and backward, both of which are 
subtests of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale and thought to measure working memory 
capacity and functioning (Wechsler, 2008). Digit span forward requires that participants repeat 
back a list of numbers, and the number of digits increases in length. Digit span backwards 
requires participants to hold a list of numbers in mind and repeat them in backwards order (from 
the order in which they are presented). Following the digit span tasks, participants completed 
Trails A and B. Trails A is purely a test of processing speed and it was chosen because it does 
not require a memory component like other processing speed tests (e.g., Digit-Symbol Coding). 
Trails B is thought to also tap executive function since it requires task switching. For Trails A, 
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participants connect a series of 25 dots in numerical order. For Trails B, participants connect a 
series of dots filled with either numbers or letters by alternating between numbers and letters. 
Finally, conditions 1 through 3 of the color-word interference subtest of the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function System were administered (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). The 
color-word interference test is primarily a measure of inhibition. In condition 1, participants must 
say the color of squares on a page as quickly as possible. In condition 2, participants must read 
words (e.g., red, blue, and green) as quickly as possible. In condition 3, participants are 
instructed to name the color of the ink that the word is printed in, while doing their best to ignore 
the fact that the word itself is a different color than the color of the ink. Participants were then 
administered the encoding and recognition portions of the mnemonic similarity task. After this 
portion of the experiment, all participants completed a mental rotation test. For this test, 
participants were shown an image for 2.5 sec followed by a delay of 2.5 sec. After the delay, 
they were shown the same image and asked to indicate whether or not it was in the same 
orientation. If it was in the same orientation, participants pressed “1” on the number keypad to 
indicate the object was “old”. If it was rotated, participants were instructed to press a number 
from “2” to “5”. These response options corresponded to the four possible degrees of rotation 
(i.e., 15° – 55°). Young adults recruited through the Psychology and Neuroscience101 
participant pool received course credit for participation. Any participant not recruited through the 
psychology 101 participant pool was paid $10/hour for their time. 
2.2.2 Stimuli 
 Typically, studies using the mnemonic similarity task employ pictures of common objects 
(e.g., a ping pong paddle, pumpkin, wagon, saxophone, etc.; Yassa et al., 2011a). These common 
objects also have similar, but different counterparts that vary to some degree from the originally 
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studied version of the item. The level of similarity was determined by asking participants not 
involved in the experiment to rate similarity on a likert scale of 1 – 7 (Kirwan & Stark, 2007). 
These stimuli allow for the measurement of PS/PC processes as similarity decreases; however, 
this procedure requires the use of subjective ratings of similarity, as opposed to systematically 
controlling for the level of similarity. Several other designs have been implemented to assess PS 
abilities, including spatial PS (Reagh et al., 2014), the effects of learning abstract representations 
on PS (Mattfeld & Stark, 2015), and the effect of repetition on PS (Reagh & Yassa, 2014). 
However, to my knowledge, only one study has used object stimuli that were systematically 
varied in lure similarity (Motley & Kirwan, 2012).  
Motley & Kirwan (2012) utilized common objects obtained from the Amsterdam Library 
of Object Images (Geusebroek et al., 2005). Importantly, these objects vary based on the angle at 
which the picture was taken. Each object was photographed 72 times, once at every 5° of 
rotation. The assumption in using these stimuli is that the greater the rotation, the less similar the 
object should be to the previously stored representation, and further, that this manipulation gives 
experimental control to similarity, as opposed to relying on subjective responses from 
participants not involved in the experiment itself. Thus, the present set of experiments uses this 
approach. In keeping with the original study, lure similarity in the current study was 
operationalized according to four degrees of rotation from the original presentation (rotated 15°, 
rotated 25°, rotated 35°, and rotated 55°). At test, there were 6 categories of stimuli; the four 
rotated trial types, as well as new stimuli and exact repeats (see Figure 2). A random angle was 
chosen for each object presented at study, and this angle was used as 0°, or as the repeat, at test. 
The amount of rotation was semi-randomly chosen, with the restriction that an even number of 
19 
stimuli were present in each of the rotation categories. Further, the rotation off 0° was randomly 
chosen to be either to the left or right. 
2.2.3 General Task design 
 With a few exceptions, much of the experimental design used for all three experiments 
was modeled after Reagh & Yassa (2014) who also employed a within-subjects manipulation. 
One exception is the intentionality of encoding. Prior studies using this paradigm are mixed as to 
whether or not the researchers used intentional or incidental encoding instructions; however, a 
study comparing the type of instructions on performance found no main effect of instruction type 
and no interaction with age and instruction type (Stark et al., 2015). Therefore, I employed 
intentional instructions under the assumption that this would not have an impact on performance 
between the age groups.   
After informed consent and the completion of the cognitive tests mentioned previously, 
participants were told about the nature of the memory task. Specifically, before the encoding 
session, participants were informed about the memory task, including the fact that they would be 
tested with exact repeats of previously encountered items (to which they should indicate “old”), 
new items (to which they should indicate “new”), and rotated items (to which they should 
indicate “rotated”). Participants were given a practice session of both the study and test portions 
of the memory task before beginning the experiment. During encoding, participants made “toy” 
or “not toy” judgments. There was no correct answer. The semantic judgment was used to ensure 
attention was given to each stimulus. 
At study, participants were shown a series of 192 common objects, one at a time, for 2.5 
sec each with a 0.5 sec inter-stimulus interval (unless otherwise noted). At test, participants were 
presented with 288 objects, 96 were repeated, 96 were rotated lures, and 96 were novel foils (see 
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Figure 2). Half of the repeats and lures were taken from the within subjects manipulations 
described below. This left 12 trials for each level of rotation. Presentation at test was always self-
paced. Participants made one of three possible judgments for each object presented at test, either 
“old”, “rotated”, or “new”. 
Finally, to assess whether there were group differences in the ability to discern rotation, 
all participants were given a brief assessment that investigated their skill at noticing rotation. 
Participants were shown a series of 25 objects taken from the same library of object images. Five 
images were presented at each degree of rotation including five from the repeat category. An 
image was shown for 2.5 sec, covered by a color noise mask (i.e., a patch of randomly colored 
pixels that completely covered the portion of the screen where the image was presented) for 2.5 
sec and then the same image was shown again as either an exact repeat or a rotated version of 
itself. Participants were given as much time as needed to make the judgment about whether the 
object was rotated or not. For this task, the response options were “old”, “15°”, “25°”, “35°”, 
“55°”. All stimuli were presented with E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). 
2.2.4 Analysis plan 
 Studies using the mnemonic similarity task have taken several approaches to analyze 
PS/PC effects; however, these studies tend to use a particular measure to account for response 
bias for similar trials in the recognition data (Stark et al., 2015). First, simple old/new 
recognition for repeat items is calculated as the difference between the numbers of “old” 
responses to repeated stimuli minus “old” responses to foils (i.e., new stimuli that were not 
encountered at study). The purpose of this correction is to account for individual participant’s 
bias to generally respond old as compared to correctly responding old. The ability to discriminate 
21 
between similar lures is measured using the lure discrimination index. This metric is calculated 
as the number of “similar” responses given to lure trials minus the number of “similar” responses 
given to foils. Again, this bias correction is used to correct for the overall tendency to say 
“similar” versus correctly indicating a stimulus is similar. These two indices, as the dependent 
variable in the model, are then entered into a 2 (Group: YA vs. OA) X 2 (Memory type: lure 
discrimination index vs. recognition) x 2 (manipulation type) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to assess the effect of age and manipulation on the different assessments of 
memory. This measure collapses across all levels of similarity and indicates whether OAs 
experience a deficit in lure discrimination, as well as whether they have an overall impairment in 
both old/new recognition and lure discrimination.  
A more fine grained analysis involves the utilization of a metric that can be investigated 
across all trial types. The lure discrimination index can also be calculated using “old” responses 
to correct for bias. In this way, the lure discrimination index is calculated as 1 minus the 
probability of “Old” responses for each trial type (i.e., the more likely you are to say “Old” the 
lower the score). Regardless of how the lure discrimination index is calculated, investigating 
behavioral changes along variations of similarity has been referred to as the behavioral tuning 
curve (see Figure 1; Stark et al., 2013). In the current study, the tuning curve was analyzed in 
two ways. In the first analysis strategy, the results were analyzed with a 2 (Group: YA vs. OA) x 
2 (experimental manipulation) x 5 (trial type) repeated measures ANOVA. For the second 
strategy, a linear multilevel model using random intercepts and slopes was used to model the 
curve directly. Using a linear multilevel model has the added benefit of modeling the curve itself, 
as well as measuring within person change across the curve. 
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Regardless of how lure discrimination is measured, it is important to know if the 
manipulations affected memory overall (e.g., old/new recognition, as well as lure discrimination) 
or if they affected the lure discrimination to a greater extent than old/new recognition. If old/new 
recognition and lure discrimination are affected equally, this would suggest that the manipulation 
did not impact the bias to PS or PC per se, but affected the quality of the representation as a 
whole. If the lure discrimination index is affected to a greater extent than that of old/new 
recognition, this would suggest that the PC bias in aging is not only caused by altered mnemonic 
processes supported by hippocampal function, but is caused by a combination of changes in 
several domains that combine and lead to a PC bias. Thus the operational definition of reducing 
or increasing the PC bias involves two metrics, 1) the lure discrimination index showing a 
greater effect than old/new recognition, and 2) that the improvements in performance across 
levels of similarity is delayed, such that more novelty is needed to PS. It is likely that both 
metrics will provide complementary information; however, both of the metrics outlined provide 
somewhat different information as to how the manipulations effect the PCB in aging. Therefore, 
inferences based on the results of the experiments will be guided by both strategies. 
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Chapter 3: Experiments and results 
3.1 Experiment 1 - Processing speed and the completion bias 
 According to the limited time mechanism of the processing speed theory, as we age, 
processing speed declines such that a greater amount of time is needed to complete the same 
amount of processing as a YA (Salthouse, 1996a). Importantly, there is evidence that when OAs 
are given a greater amount of time to make recognition judgments during the mnemonic 
similarity task, the behavioral deficits are attenuated (Allen, Morris, Stark, Fortin, & Stark, 2015; 
although see Stark et al., 2015 for an opposing finding). As indicated previously, Allen et al. 
(2015) and Stark et al. (2015) manipulated time at decision making, leaving open the question as 
to whether or not differential time at encoding allows OAs to compensate for their slower 
processing speed and to encode representations that are similar to that of YAs.  
Most studies in this line of research have provided both OAs and YAs with two to three 
seconds to study the to-be-encoded materials (e.g., Stark et al., 2015; Toner et al., 2009; Yassa et 
al., 2011a). Specifically, related to the type of encoding processes that might support the creation 
of robust mental representations, it has been shown that not only do OAs tend to have slower 
processing speed in general, but they also have slower ability to narrow their focus of attention, 
requiring twice as long as YAs to selectively focus their attention (Jefferies et al., 2015). 
Therefore, if OAs and YAs are given the same amount of time to encode a complex 
representation, it is highly unlikely that OAs are able to attend to as many features as YAs, 
leading OAs to form a more gist-based representation.  
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 To assess whether or not the strength of the encoded representation is impacted by the 
rate of presentation at encoding, two different rates of presentation were given as a within 
subjects manipulation to both YAs and OAs. For YAs, half of the stimuli were presented at a rate 
of 1.25 sec and half were presented at a rate of 2.5 sec. For OAs, half of the stimuli were 
presented at a rate of 2.5 sec and half were presented at a rate of 5 sec. For both groups, the rate 
of presentation changed every 8 objects. Participants were also presented with a screen during 
the regular fixation period indicating whether the next 8 objects would be presented at the fast or 
slow rate. The rate of presentation that started the study trials was counterbalanced across 
subjects.  
If the PCB occurs because OAs are not able to complete the same type of processing in a 
limited amount of time given, then two results should be observed. First, YAs, under conditions 
that employ a 1.25 sec presentation rate for stimulus presentation, should show a bias toward PC, 
as compared to a condition in which stimuli are presented 2.5 sec. Thus, an interaction between 
rate of presentation, memory, and age would be found. This data pattern should emerge due to 
the limited amount of processing that YAs are able to accomplish in the 1.25 sec condition, 
mimicking the limited time mechanism that occurs in aging. Second, OAs, under conditions that 
employ a 5 sec rate for stimulus presentation, should show a reduced PCB, as compared to a 
condition in which stimuli are presented for 2.5 sec. Again, this pattern should be observed 
because OAs should be able to accomplish a similar amount of processing as YAs when given 
additional encoding time. In the analysis of old/new recognition and the overall lure 
discrimination index, OAs should show a reduced lure discrimination index in the 5 sec 
condition, while YAs in the 1.25 sec condition should show a lure discrimination deficit. In the 
analysis of the lure discrimination index across all trials, OAs should exhibit a more rapid 
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improvement in performance across degrees of rotation in the 5 sec condition while YAs in the 
1.25 sec condition should exhibit a delay in the improvement of performance across degrees of 
rotation. 
3.1.1 Results 
3.1.1.1 Participants 
 Twenty-five YAs and 25 OAs completed the experiment. We retained all participants’ 
data because no participant performed at chance for old/new recognition during either 
presentation rates. Our OAs were significantly more educated, t(48) = -9.47, p < .001 . As 
expected, our OAs were also slower to perform Trails A, t(48) = -4.17, p < .001, Trails B, t(48) = 
-2.80, p = .007, color naming time, t(48) = -4.01, p < .001, word reading time, t(48) = -2.19, p = 
.033, and color-word interference time, t(48) = -5.21, p < .001. As a more direct measure of 
inhibition we subtracted the color naming time from the color-word interference time as is 
recommended in the DKEFS scoring manual (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). This measure 
was also significantly different between OAs and YAs, t(48) = -4.14, p < .001, suggesting that 
OAs in our sample had reduced processing speed and reduced inhibitory processes. There were 
no other group differences. See Table 1 for means and standard errors of all the cognitive 
measures collected. 
3.1.1.2 Old/New Recognition and the overall lure discrimination index 
 Recognition and lure discrimination index scores were calculated for each group and 
within each speed condition and were analyzed with a 2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(rate of 
presentation: standard (2.5 sec) vs. non-standard (1.25 or 5 sec)) x 2(Memory type: old/new 
recognition vs. lure discrimination index) repeated-measures ANOVA (see Figure 3). There was 
a main effect of memory type, F(1,48) = 384.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .89, such that old/new 
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recognition was significantly better than lure discrimination. There was no main effect of group, 
F(1,48) = 1.98, p = .166, ηp2 = .04, and no main effect of rate of presentation, F(1,48) = 2.59, p = 
.114, ηp2 = .05. These effects were qualified by significant interactions between memory type 
and group, F(1,48) = 6.97, p = .011, ηp2 = .13, as well as rate of presentation and group, F(1,48) 
= 32.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .41. No other effects were significant. To better understand the memory 
type by group interaction we conducted a t-test on the old/new recognition data averaged across 
the rate of presentation. There was no significant difference between old/new recognition 
between OAs and YAs, t(48) = -.26, p = .800, indicating the interaction resulted from a deficit in 
OAs lure discrimination as compared to YAs. The results replicate prior findings from Stark and 
colleagues (2013) and support the idea that OAs perform worse on lure discrimination as 
compared to YAs, despite maintaining similar performance for old/new recognition. The rate of 
presentation by group interaction analysis also provided evidence that the rate of presentation 
altered memory performance. When YAs were given a faster rate of presentation (M = .43, SD = 
.09) their overall memory performance declined, as compared to the regular presentation rate (M 
= .47, SD = .13), whereas when OAs were given a slower rate of presentation (M = .44, SD = 
.11), their overall memory performance improved, as compared to the regular presentation rate 
(M = .37, SD = .13).  
3.1.1.3 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – repeated measures ANOVA 
Analyzing data between two age groups often requires that differences in response biases 
be accounted for in the data. In this study, I opted to use a previously established bias correction 
of one minus the probability of indicating “old” to each trial type. This metric places all 3 trial 
types (i.e., old, rotated, and new) on the same dependent variable, and assumes that the only 
difference between old trials and rotated trials is the rate at which participants improve in their 
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ability to indicate that a stimulus has been rotated. To ensure that this bias metric was 
appropriate for this data set, I calculated rates of “new” responses both to new trials, and 
separately, averaged across old and similar trials. T-tests revealed no significant differences 
between YAs (M = 80.48, SD = 9.54) and OAs (M = 78.16, SD = 10.61) in rates of responding 
“new” to new trials, t(48) = 0.81, p = .420, and no significant differences in YAs (M = 3.34, SD 
= 1.69) and OAs (M = 2.91, SD = 1.5) rates of responding “new” to old or similar trials, t(48) = 
0.94, p = .354. I also examined the rates of “new” only to old trials and rates of “new” only to 
lure trials. No significant differences were found, all p’s > .18. Therefore, changes in the groups’ 
performance across the lure discrimination index was not influenced by a difference in the ability 
to recognize an object as previously seen. 
The lure discrimination index across all trials was analyzed using one minus the 
probability of old as the dependent variable and a 2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(rate of presentation: 
standard (2.5 sec) vs. non-standard (1.25 or 5 sec)) x 5(degree of rotation: repeat - 55°) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Rate of presentation and degree of rotation were within subjects factor and 
group was a between subjects factor (see Figure 4). Results revealed a significant main effect of 
degree of rotation, F(4,192) = 121.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .72, such that performance improved 
significantly across the increasing degrees of rotation. There was no main effect of rate of 
presentation, F(1,48) = .23, p = .633, ηp2 = .01, but there was a significant main effect of group, 
F(1,48) = 6.74, p = .012, ηp2 = .12, indicating that YAs performed better than OAs overall. There 
were no significant interactions between rate of presentation and group, F(1,48) = 2.13, p = .151, 
ηp2 = .04, degree of rotation and group, F(4,192) = 1.62, p = .170, ηp2 = .03, and rate of 
presentation and degree of rotation, F(4,192) = .15, p = .964, ηp2 < .01. However, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between degree of rotation, rate of presentation, and group, 
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F(4,192) = 4.06, p = .004, ηp2 = .08. I conducted a repeated measures ANOVA independently at 
each degree of rotation to probe the three way interaction with a between subjects factor of group 
and a within subjects factor of rate of presentation. The only significant effect of group occurred 
at 25° of rotation, F(1,48) = 10.30, p = .002, ηp2 = .18, and at 55° of rotation, F(1,48) = 7.73, p = 
.008, ηp2 = .14. There were, however, significant (or marginally significant) interactions between 
group and rate of presentation at 15° and 55°, p’s < .066, but no significant interaction between 
group and rate of presentation when objects were rotated 25° and 35°, p’s > .715. In general, 
YAs outperformed OAs across all degrees of rotation, except for when the objects are exact 
repeats. Further, in the exact repeat condition, OAs in the 2.5 sec condition (M = .34, SD = .16) 
and YAs in the 1.25 sec condition (M = .35, SD = .11) performed nearly identically, whereas, 
both groups performed better when they were given more time to encode the materials (OAs 5 
sec: M = .26, SD = .13; YAs 2.5 sec: M = .30, SD = .12). In sum, in the exact repeat condition, 
both groups performed better during their respective slower rate of presentation. Further, in the 
55° rotation condition, both groups performed better in the slower conditions (see Figure 4). 
These results provide evidence that both OAs’ and YAs’ mnemonic performance was improved 
when they were given more time to study the objects, suggesting that the rate of presentation 
affects pattern separation processes, and that processing speed is an important factor in efficient 
PS in both OAs and YAs.    
3.1.1.4 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – Multilevel model 
 The advantage of a repeated measures ANOVA in this context is the comparison of mean 
differences in performance at each level of the task. A complementary way to look at the data is 
to investigate how YAs’ and OAs’ performance changes across the different degrees of rotation, 
instead of whether performance is different at each level of rotation. To investigate this question, 
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I implemented a multi-level model since such models properly account for nesting, in this case 
degrees of rotation within people, and account for the correlated residuals within the data set. In 
support of this choice, I calculated an intra-class correlation (ICC) by running a model with no 
predictors and a random intercept. An ICC provides a measure of how much variance in the 
model comes from within subjects as compared to between subjects. The ICC for the current 
model was .14, indicating that 14% of the variance came from between subjects. Of note, a 
repeated measures ANOVA would make the assumption that this value is zero. Another 
advantage of a multi-level model is that it allows for the measurement of within-person change 
over degrees of rotation, rather than measuring group mean change over degrees of rotation. This 
procedure affords the opportunity to better understand how the individual’s memory 
performance changes across rotation.  
To build an appropriate model for the data set, I tested to ensure a linear model was the 
best fit, as compared to a model with a quadratic term. Including a quadratic term caused a 
marginally significant improvement in model fit, χ2(4) = 8.3, p = .081. The quadratic term was 
significant in this model, t(448) = -2.00, p = .046, however, the estimate of the fixed effect was -
.007 indicating that the slope curved less than a percent at each degree of rotation. Since there 
was mixed support for including a quadratic term I did not include it in the final model. Also, the 
added complexity of a model with a quadratic term is not warranted given the small estimate of 
the fixed effect.  I also tested the model to see if allowing for unequal variance between groups 
improved model fit and, again, it did not, χ2(4) = 4.0, p = .406. The final model investigating the 
lure discrimination index, as calculated using one minus the probability of old, was a linear 
model with random intercepts (i.e., performance on trials that were exact repeats) and random 
slopes (i.e., the rate at which performance improved). The model included a between-subjects 
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effect of group, a within subjects effect of degree of rotation and rate of presentation, and used 
YAs in the 2.5 sec condition as the reference group. 
The analysis indicated there was no effect of group on the ability to indicate that an exact 
repeat was old, t(48) = .90, p = .372, suggesting that when the rate of presentation was the same 
between the two groups, the rate of endorsing repeated items as “old” was  the same for both age 
groups. The rate of presentation manipulation did have an effect on the ability to indicate an 
exact repeat was “old” for both groups. An effect of rate of presentation on repeated objects 
indicated YAs’ performance was significantly worse when they were given a faster rate of 
presentation, t(444) = 2.41, p = .016, and an interaction between group and rate of presentation 
on intercepts indicated OAs’ performance was significantly better when they were given a 
slower rate of presentation, t(444) = -3.94, p < .001. Therefore, OAs in both rate of presentation 
conditions were not significantly different in their ability to indicate a repeated object was “old” 
as compared to YAs in the 2.5 sec rate of presentation condition. Young Adults, however, 
performed worse during the 1.25 sec rate of presentation condition, as compared to the 2.5 sec 
condition and OAs in the 5 sec rate of presentation condition. OAs in the 5000ms rate of 
presentation condition performed better than YAs in the 1.25 sec rate of presentation condition 
and OAs in the 2.5 sec rate of presentation condition (see Figure 5). 
There was a significant effect of degree of rotation, t(444) = 12.71, p < .001, indicating 
that YAs’ performance in the 2.5 sec rate of presentation condition improved with greater 
rotation of the object. The rate of improvement was significantly worse for OAs in the 2.5 sec 
condition, compared to YAs in the 2.5 sec condition, as indicated by a significant interaction 
between rotation and group, t(444) = -3.55, p < .001. The rate of improvement for YAs in the 
1.25 sec condition was also significantly worse than YAs in the 2.5 sec condition as indicated by 
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a significant interaction between rotation and rate of presentation, t(444) = -2.48, p = .014. 
Finally, OAs in the 5 sec condition’s rate of improvement was significantly better than OAs in 
the 2.5 sec condition as indicated by a significant three way interaction, t(444) = 3.82, p < .001. 
See Table 2 for parameter estimates. 
To better understand the pattern of the results, I calculated simple effects for intercepts 
and slopes (see model implied results in Figure 6). The pattern of results indicates that OAs, 
regardless of the rate of presentation manipulation, were not significantly different in their ability 
to indicate a repeated object is “old” as compared to YAs in the 2.5 sec condition. Further, OAs’ 
performance in the 5 sec conditions improved (slope = .106) in a similar manner to that of YAs’ 
performance in the 2.5 sec rate of presentation condition (slope = .117). Older adults in the 2.5 
sec condition also exhibited similar rates of improvement (slope = .072), as YAs in the 1.25 sec 
condition (slope = .088). Finally, to determine whether the rate of presentation manipulation 
matched the performance between OAs and YAs, I conducted two t-tests on slopes (i.e., rate of 
improvement across degrees of rotation). Despite the improvement in slopes for OAs in the 5 sec 
condition, these participants still had a significantly lower slope than YAs in the 2.5 sec 
condition, t(48) = 3.63, p = .001. Similarly, YAs in the 1.25 sec condition had a steeper slope 
than OAs in the 2.5 sec condition, t(48) = 5.31, p < .001. Therefore, a slower rate of presentation 
significantly improved OAs slopes; however, it did not completely attenuate the deficit in 
memory. A faster rate of presentation significantly decreased YAs slopes. However, they still 
improved across trials more rapidly than OAs in the 2.5 sec condition. Processing speed 
differences, as manipulated by presentation rate, appear to be a contributor to the PCB in aging. 
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3.1.1.5 Rotation test 
 Participants were generally quite poor at indicating the exact degree of rotation during the 
rotation test. Therefore, I collapsed all estimates of degree of rotation into a single metric of 
correctly indicating whether an object was rotated or not. There was a significant difference in 
YAs and OAs ability to discern whether an object was rotated or not as revealed by the rotation 
test. This difference was significant for accurately indicating an object was an exact repeat, t(48) 
= 2.22, p = .031, indicating an object was rotated, t(48) = 3.15, p = .003, and for overall 
performance on the rotation test, t(48) = 3.69, p = .001, with YAs (M = .90, SD = .06) 
outperforming OAs (M = .83, SD = .08) overall. Since there was a group difference in the ability 
to discern whether an object was rotated outside the long term memory aspects of the regular 
task, I performed follow up analyses controlling for overall rotation test performance for both the 
repeated measures ANOVA and the multilevel model that investigated the lure discrimination 
index across all trials. Importantly, the three-way interaction between group, rate of presentation, 
and rotation remained significant in the repeated measures ANOVA analysis. Further, the pattern 
of results in the multilevel model remained unchanged after controlling for performance on the 
rotation test. In combination, these follow up analyses indicate that group differences in the 
ability to assess rotation in short term memory is not the primary factor for group differences in 
the ability to notice small changes in long term mnemonic representations. 
3.1.1.6 Individual differences in the lure discrimination index 
 Experiment 1 manipulated processing speed to assess whether there is a significant 
impact of duration at encoding on measures of pattern separation. While the evidence suggests 
that processing speed does significantly moderate the PCB in aging, it is also important to 
understand what individual characteristics of cognition may further contribute to the PCB in 
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aging. Prior research has investigated individual differences associated with pattern separation 
(e.g., Toner et al., 2009; Stark et al., 2010). However, both studies had much smaller sample 
sizes, collected cognitive measures only in OAs, and rarely found significant effects. This leaves 
open the question as to what types of non-mnemonic cognitive processes, may support efficient 
PS. It is likely that the lack of significant correlations has contributed to the general notion that 
PS and PC processes in some ways operate in a vacuum.  
As an exploratory analysis, I extracted each individuals’ intercept (i.e., model implied 
performance on old trials), slope (i.e., rate of improvement across the degrees of rotation) and 
lure trial performance, and correlated that number to their scores on digit span forward and 
backward, trails A and B, and the measure of inhibition derived from subtracting the color 
naming time from the color-word interference time. First, I combined both OAs and YAs in the 
2.5 sec condition into a single group (n = 50). In this condition, both groups were exposed to the 
same task, and therefore, it is appropriate to assume that the scores in both groups represent the 
same basic effect. Second, I ran the same correlations with YAs in the 1.25 sec condition as a 
single group (n = 25) and OAs in the 5 sec condition as a single group (n = 25). Across all 
exploratory analyses I performed 45 correlations. A Bonferroni corrected alpha value (i.e., 
.05/45) is .001; however, all significant correlations below an alpha of .05 are reported for 
completeness.  
 Correlations derived from the 2.5 sec condition revealed that measures of processing 
speed and inhibition were found to be significantly correlated with both intercepts and slopes. 
Participants intercepts were significantly positively correlated with time on Trails B, r(47) = .34, 
p = .016. Since Trails B is thought to measure processing speed along with executive function, 
this correlation suggests that as executive function declines, so does the ability to encode a 
34 
representation that supports simple recognition of repeat items. This was the only significant 
correlation with intercepts. Participants slopes were significantly negatively correlated with time 
on Trails A, r(48) = -.51, p < .001, Trails B, r(47) = -.48, p < .001 , and the measure of 
inhibition, r(48) = -.53, p < .001. The same pattern of results was found when using lure trial 
performance such that a significant correlation was found between lure trial performance and 
time on Trails A, r(48) = -.41, p = .003, Trails B, r(47) = -.38, p = .007, and the measure of 
inhibition, r(48) = -.33, p = .019. All of the correlations with slopes and lure trial performance 
suggest that processing speed, executive function, and inhibition correlate strongly the ability to 
PS. As processing speed, executive function, and inhibition decline, so does the ability to 
efficiently PS. Therefore, the PCB in aging is likely due to a myriad of cognitive changes that 
occur with age, as opposed to a deficit in a single domain of cognition (i.e., memory).  When 
looking within groups at the different rate of presentations, only time on Trails B for OAs in the 
5 sec condition was found to be significantly correlated, r(22) = -.43, p = .037. In sum, 
processing speed and inhibition have strong relationships with participant’s performance, both on 
their ability to recognize an object as old, and to notice that an object has been rotated. 
3.1.2 Discussion 
 The results of this experiment support the hypothesis that age-related processing speed 
deficits contribute to the PCB in aging. The analysis of old/new recognition and the overall lure 
discrimination index replicate a wide body of literature showing that OAs experience a decline in 
lure discrimination, despite maintaining similar performance on old/new recognition (e.g., Stark 
et al., 2015; Toner et al., 2009). This result was true regardless of the rate of presentation 
manipulation, suggesting that giving OAs more time does not improve the memory changes 
associated with the PCB. Importantly, when using a lure discrimination index that calculates 
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performance changes across degrees of rotation, a complementary, but slightly different result 
was found. The core result, that OAs show impairments in lure discrimination, was observed. 
When YAs and OAs were given the typical rate of presentation (i.e., 2.5 sec) they exhibited 
similar rates of saying “old” to trials that were exact repeats, yet OAs exhibited a decline in their 
ability to make fine grain discriminations between previously encountered stimuli and stimuli 
that were rotated.  
The results also revealed that OAs’ and YAs’ ability to efficiently pattern separate was 
significantly impacted by the amount of time given to study a stimulus. This finding would not 
be surprising if the manipulation only affected participant’s ability to discriminate between old 
and new trials. The fact that providing OAs more study time uniquely improved their ability to 
make fine grain discriminations between previously studied images and the rotated versions 
presented at test, suggests that the PCB can be modulated by processing speed changes that occur 
with age. Further, when YAs’ were given less study time, their performance was highly similar 
to OAs. Not only can OA’s performance be improved to mirror YA’s, YA’s performance can be 
modulated to mirror that of OA’s. These results are at direct odds with the notion that the PCB in 
aging cannot be “overcome” (Stark et al., 2015). The hypothesized change of performance based 
on study time provides compelling evidence that the PCB in aging is not solely based on 
mnemonic changes associated with age. The sensitivity of pattern separation to rate of 
presentation indicates a much more complex picture of how mnemonic representations are 
formed, retrieved, and how aging impacts these processes. 
In the context of cognitive aging theories, this experiment adds to a body of literature 
suggesting that age-related memory changes share variance with measures of processing speed 
(Salthouse, 2000). More specifically, the results of the current experiment showed correlations 
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between measures of processing speed (i.e., Trails A and B) and participants’ pattern separation 
performance. While this result fits well within the processing speed literature, it is at odds with 
some of the findings in the pattern separation literature. Toner et al. (2009) conducted an object 
pattern separation task and also collected several measures of cognition in OAs. Their results 
revealed only one significant correlation between performance on lure trials and letter 
sequencing (i.e., a task similar to Trails A, but using letters). No significant correlations were 
found between other measures of processing speed that were collected. These results suggest that 
processing speed shares a minimal relationship with PS abilities, yet the results from the current 
experiment suggests that processing speed is intimately related to PS. First, there are many 
differences in the way the correlations were calculated. Whereas the current study used slopes, or 
the change in performance across as well as average lure trial performance, Toner et al. (2009) 
used average performance across all lure trials. While correlations were observed with lure trial 
performance, these relationships were weaker than the correlations with slope. Second, Toner et 
al. (2009) collected these measures on only 20 older adults and, therefore, likely had 
significantly less power to find the effect. Despite these issues, even the non-significant 
correlations were in the same direction. Therefore, the correlations found in this experiment 
between processing speed measures and performance on the mnemonic similarity task adds to 
our understanding of what may mediate age-related changes in pattern separation. 
The current experiment also adds to the pattern separation literature by providing 
empirical evidence that memory processes required to support highly detailed discriminations are 
significantly influenced by processing speed changes. While memory declines with age, this 
experiment shows that the declines in memory as evidenced by the mnemonic similarity task are 
not simply the byproduct of inefficient PS processes, but also a byproduct of reduced processing 
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speed that occurs with age. It also suggests that even in YAs, pattern separation processes require 
time to form strong mnemonic representations. The importance of this point should not be 
understated, as understanding how time interacts with pattern separation processes will be a 
critical next step in building knowledge on the PCB in aging, as well as memory functions in 
general. It is possible that given even greater study periods (e.g., 7.5 sec), OAs may fully recover 
mnemonic discrimination performance. If this is found, then it would suggest that PS processes 
are not the cause of memory changes in mnemonic discrimination and that the PCB in aging is 
simply a byproduct of age related slowing. This result would fundamentally alter the memory 
related theories associated with aging. However, this result is unlikely. While greater time at 
encoding improves mnemonic discrimination on this task, there is ample evidence to support the 
notion that aging causes neural changes in mnemonic processes that support episodic memory 
function, and thus, impairments are likely to be found even if encoding times longer than five 
seconds are used. 
3.2 Experiment 2 - Resource deficit and the completion bias 
 The resource deficit theory proposes that as we age, we experience a decline in the 
resources that our available to engage in effortful processing (e.g., Craik, 1983, 1986; Craik & 
Byrd, 1982). Reduced resources impose restrictions on the ability to accomplish cognitively 
demanding tasks including self-initiated encoding processes, generation of novel connections, 
and the use of strategic process that may improve encoding or retrieval (Zacks, Hasher, Li, 
2000). One way to assess the role of resources in cognition is to reduce the resources available to 
engage in a primary task, by having participants simultaneously engage in a secondary task (e.g., 
Anderson et al., 1998; Craik & McDowd, 1987; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; Kim & Giovanello, 
2011; Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Kreuger, 2005). Performance decrements in the primary 
38 
task are caused by a reduction in available resources which are used by the secondary task. In 
support of the idea that cognitive changes that occur with age are caused by a reduction in 
available resources, when YA’s attention is divided, deficits in performance often mirror that of 
OAs under full attention conditions (e.g., Anderson et al., 1998; Kim & Giovanello, 2011; 
Naveh-Benjamin, Craik, Guez, & Kreuger, 2005). 
 To examine the impact of resources, or a reduction in resources due to age, on PS 
processes, a divided attention manipulation was used that specifically taxes relational attention 
(Kim & Giovanello, 2011). Relational attention refers to the idea that attending to relationships 
within or between stimuli requires a pool of attentional resources that supports relational 
memory processes. Kim & Giovanello (2011) provided evidence that dividing attention with 
relational processing produced relational memory deficits in YAs’ that mimicked the relational 
memory deficit seen in OAs under full attention conditions. More specifically, participants 
intentionally encoded word pairs while also making judgments about which of two numbers, 
presented simultaneously with the word pairs, was numerically larger. Encoding word pairs and 
judging the relative numerical size of two numbers requires relational attention. Kim & 
Giovanello (2011) found that YAs under divided relational attention conditions exhibited 
relational memory deficits that precisely mirrored that of OAs under full attention. Therefore, a 
reduction in the pool of relational attention resources may also contribute to the PCB in aging. 
While the paradigm employed in this study was not a typical relational memory design 
(e.g., encoding two words, names with faces, a picture in a certain location, etc.), successfully 
encoding the stimuli for later distinction between the studied item and similar items required the 
binding of the stimulus with all of its specific features. For example, when presented with a 
picture of a “house” at encoding, a typical item memory study would simply show a series of 
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images and instruct participants to indicate whether or not the “house” was seen previously, 
without showing other similar houses. Therefore, to successfully indicate that the “house” was in 
fact seen previously, one simply needs to remember that a house was presented at study, not 
necessarily that specific “house” with all of its unique features. For the current paradigm, 
participants must remember more about the “house” stimulus than its presence. Participants also 
need to retrieve the angle at which the “house” was presented by remembering what specific 
features of the house were visible at encoding. Since successful memory is supported by the 
encoding of within item features, this paradigm taxes relational memory processes. Therefore, a 
divided attention manipulation that taxes relational attention was used (Kim & Giovanello, 
2011).  
 Experiment 2 employed the same task design as Experiment 1. However, all stimuli were 
presented for 2.5sec followed by a fixation for .5sec. During the encoding of the object, 
participants made one of two judgments, either (1) which of two numbers presented at the 
bottom of the screen was numerically larger (i.e., the divided attention condition), or (2) whether 
the object was a toy or not a toy (i.e., the full attention condition). Participants made one number 
comparison per study image. To reduce the difficulty of task switching, participants were given 
small blocks (8 images) of divided attention and full attention conditions. Between each 
transition to the number judgment and toy judgment, a word (i.e., either Toy or Number) was 
presented during the fixation period to prepare the participant for the type of judgment that 
would accompany the next 8 objects. The blocks of full attention and divided attention switched 
back and forth between the two types of decisions until all of the objects were presented. The 
decision that started the study trials was counterbalanced across subjects such that some 
participants started with the toy judgment and others started with the number judgment.  
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If the hypothesis that a reduction in attentional resources contributes to the PCB in aging 
is supported, OAs in the full attention condition should perform similarly to YAs in the divided 
attention condition. Therefore, an interaction between age, attention, and memory should be 
found. In the analysis of old/new recognition and the overall lure discrimination index, OAs in 
the full attention condition and YAs in the divided attention should show a lure discrimination 
deficit as compared to YAs in the full attention condition. In the analysis of lure discrimination 
across all trials, OAs in the full attention condition and YAs in the divided attention condition 
should show a similar delay in improvement in performance across degrees of rotation as 
compared to YAs in the full attention condition. 
3.2.1 Results 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-five YAs and 19 OAs completed the experiment. One OA participant’s data was 
not recorded due to a technical error. Our OAs were significantly more educated, t(42) = -6.08, p 
< .001 . As expected, our OAs were also slower to perform Trails A, t(42) = -5.60, p < .001, 
Trails B, t(42) = -4.06, p < .001, color naming time, t(42) = -4.31, p < .001, word reading time, 
t(42) = -3.07, p < .001, and color-word interference time, t(42) = -5.15, p < .001. Therefore, our 
sample of OAs exhibited a decrement in processing speed. Again, as a more direct measure of 
inhibition we subtracted the color naming time from the color-word interference time. This 
measure was also significantly different between OAs and YAs, t(42) = -3.73, p = .001, 
suggesting that OAs in our sample had reduced inhibitory processes. There were no other group 
differences. See Table 3 for means and standard errors of all the cognitive measures collected. 
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3.2.1.2 Old/New Recognition and the overall lure discrimination index 
 To investigate the effect of age and the attention manipulation on old/new recognition 
and the overall lure discrimination index, a 2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(Attention: Full vs. 
Divided) x 2(Memory type: Old/new vs. Lure Discrimination) repeated measures ANOVA with 
group as a between-subjects factor and attention and memory type as a within-subjects factors 
was conducted. The analysis revealed a significant main effect of the attention manipulation, 
F(1,41) = 88.91, p < .001, ηp2 = .68, such that performance overall was worse during divided 
attention than during full attention. There was also a significant main effect of memory type, 
F(1,41) = 238.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .85, indicating worse performance for lure trials as compared to 
old/new recognition. Additionally, a significant main effect of group, F(1,41) = 19.62, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .32, was observed, indicating that overall OAs performed significantly worse than YAs. 
There was also a significant interaction between the attention manipulation and memory type, 
F(1,41) = 26.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .39, such that the mean difference between memory types was 
significantly greater in the full attention condition (M = .38, SD = .16) than the divided attention 
condition (M = .27, SD = .15). No other effects were significant, all p’s > .17.  
In sum, OAs’ overall performance was significantly worse than YAs’ overall 
performance. However, the divided attention manipulation had a stronger impact on performance 
than predicted for both OAs and YAs, producing large effects on old/new recognition (see Figure 
7). While old/new recognition rates do not need to be precisely the same between groups and 
conditions, the divided attention task appears to have rendered encoding too weak to support 
simple old/new recognition in YAs. Further, OAs’ performance in the full attention condition 
was much lower than YAs’ in the full attention condition, suggesting that for OAs, the difficulty 
of the divided attention task carried over into the full attention condition. The effect of divided 
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attention on old/new performance renders an interpretation about the specific role of PS in this 
task not possible. 
3.2.1.3 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – Repeated measures ANOVA 
 Since lure discrimination index across all trials relies on similar rates of “new” responses 
across old and rotated trials, I conducted several group comparisons on “new” response rates. 
Interestingly, there was a significant difference in rates of “new” responses to trials that were not 
encountered in the study portion of the task, t(41) = 3.43, p = .001, where YAs (M = 81.16, SD = 
11.25) were significantly more accurate than OAs (M = 70.78, SD = 10.34). OAs (M = 3.90, SD 
= 3.00) were significantly more likely than YAs (M = 2.21, SD = 1.44) to indicate an old or 
rotated trial was “new” in the full attention condition, t(41) = -2.47, p = .018; however, there was 
no significant difference between OAs (M = 6.74, SD = 3.60) and YAs (M = 5.67, SD = 1.92) in 
rates of responding “new” in the divided attention condition, t(41) = -1.27, p = .213. These 
results confirm the idea that the divided attention manipulation prevented adequate engagement 
with the to-be-remembered objects such that even a memory strong enough to support simple 
old/new recognition was impaired.   
A 2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(Attention: Full vs. Divided) x 5(Rotation: repeat – 55°) 
repeated measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor and the attention 
manipulation and degree of rotation as within-subjects factors was used to analyze lure 
discrimination using one minus the probability of old as the dependent variable. There was a 
main effect of attention, F(1,41) = 71.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .63, such that performance was 
significantly worse in the divided attention condition, as compared to the full attention condition. 
There was also a significant main effect of rotation, F(4,164) = 65.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, 
indicating that performance improved as the degree of rotation increased. There was no 
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significant main effect of group, F(1,41) = .69, p = .410, ηp2 = .02. There was no significant 
interaction between the attention manipulation and group, F(1,41) = 1.74, p =.194, ηp2 = .04, 
indicating that overall, the difference in performance between full and divided attention was 
equal between the two groups. There was, however, a significant interaction between degree of 
rotation and group, F(4,164) = 6.74, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, indicating that OAs’ performed 
significantly worse across the degrees of rotation, and degree of rotation and the attention 
manipulation, F(4,164) = 3.31, p = .012, ηp2 =.08, indicating that there was less improvement in 
performance across degrees of rotation in the divided attention condition. There was no three 
way interaction between degree of rotation, group, and the attention manipulation, F(4,164) = 
1.18, p = .321, ηp2 = .028. In summary, OAs’ performance increases across degrees of rotation 
were less than that of YAs, and when attention was divided, performance was equivalently 
reduced in both groups (see Figure 8).  
3.2.1.4 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – Multilevel model 
 The ICC for this data set was .19, which indicates that 19% of the variance comes from 
between subjects as opposed to within subjects. I tested the model to ensure that a linear model 
was appropriate and found no significant improvement in fit when the model included a 
quadratic term, χ2(4) = 5.3, p = .258. I also tested the model to ensure that a single variance 
estimate for both groups was best fit. There was a marginally significant improvement in fit 
when including separate variance estimates for YAs and OAs, χ2(4) = 9.3, p = .054. However, I 
opted to not include this in the final model for parsimony. I also ran the model with and without 
the separate variance components and the pattern of results remained the same. 
 The final model was a 2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(Attention: Full vs. Divided) x 
5(Rotation: repeat – 55°) linear model with random intercepts and slopes. The results indicated a 
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significant effect of group on intercepts, t(41) = 2.28, p = .028, where OAs in the full attention 
condition were slightly worse at indicating a repeated object was “old” as compared to YAs. 
There was a significant effect of dividing attention on repeated object performance for YAs, 
t(381) = 7.51, p < .001, and a significant interaction between group and divided attention on 
repeated object performance, t(381) = -2.05, p = .041. Young adults, therefore, were significantly 
worse at indicating an old object was old during the divided attention task and so were OAs who 
performed at almost the same rate as YAs. There was a significant effect of rotation on 
performance, t(381) = 12.91, p < .001, indicating that performance improved with greater object 
rotation. There was also a significant interaction between degree of rotation and group, t(381) = -
4.27, p < .001, indicating that OAs improved less across degrees of rotation as compared to YAs, 
and a significant interaction between degree of rotation and divided attention, t(381) = -3.70, p < 
.001, indicating that the divided attention manipulation caused both groups to improve less 
across degrees of rotation. There was no significant three way interaction between degree of 
rotation, group, and divided attention, t(381) = 1.55, p = .122. See Table 4 for parameter 
estimates of the effects. Taken together these results indicate that YAs’ performance across 
degrees of rotation improved most rapidly in the full attention condition. Rate of improvement 
for all other groups and conditions was significantly worse. Young adults in the divided attention 
condition, OAs in the full attention, and OAs in the divided attention condition improved across 
degrees of rotation at similar rates (see Figure 9).  
3.2.1.5 Rotation test 
 As in the prior experiment, I collapsed all estimates of degree of rotation into a single 
metric of correctly indicating whether an object was rotated or not. The results of the rotation test 
revealed a significant difference in YAs and OAs ability to discern whether an object was rotated 
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or not. This difference was significant for accurately indicating an object was an exact repeat, 
t(41) = 2.94, p = .005, indicating an object was rotated, t(41) = 2.34, p = .024, and for overall 
performance on the rotation test, t(41) = 3.70, p = .001, with YAs (M = .90, SD = .06) 
outperforming OAs (M = .81, SD = .08) overall. I conducted follow up analyses controlling for 
overall rotation test performance for both the repeated measures ANOVA and the multilevel 
model that investigated the lure discrimination index across all trials. Importantly, the pattern of 
results in the repeated measures ANOVA and the multilevel model remained unchanged after 
controlling for performance on the rotation test. In combination, these follow up analyses 
indicate that group differences in the ability to assess rotation in short term memory is not the 
driving factor in group differences in the ability to notice small changes in long term mnemonic 
representations. 
3.2.1.6 Individual differences 
In Experiment 2, I manipulated attention to assess the role of attentional resources on PS. 
Since performance was impacted to a greater extent than predicted, no conclusions can be drawn 
about the specific role of attentional resources in the process of PS; however, this does not 
preclude the ability to investigate the types of cognition that support PS. It is possible that the 
difficulty associated with the divided attention task could cause the relationships between the 
various measures of cognition to weaken. This could reflect the fact that the measures of memory 
performance were altered to the point that they no longer represented memory function. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the increased task difficulty may actually strengthen the 
relationships and aid in elucidating the domain general cognitive processes that support PS.  
Each individuals’ intercept (i.e., model implied performance on old trials), slope (i.e., rate 
of improvement across the degrees of rotation), and lure trial performance were extracted. These 
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numbers were then correlated with their scores on digit span forward and backward, trails A and 
B, and the measure of inhibition derived from subtracting the color naming time from the color-
word interference time. Correlations between all participants intercepts, slopes, and lure trial 
performance in the full and divided attention conditions were examined (n = 43 in both 
conditions). Thirty exploratory correlations were run. A Bonferroni corrected p-value (.05/30) in 
this case is .002, but again, all correlations below .05 will be reported for completeness. 
 Correlations derived from the full attention condition revealed that measures of 
processing speed and inhibition were significantly correlated with both intercepts, slopes, and 
lure trial performance. Participants intercepts were significantly positively correlated with time 
on Trails A, r(41) = .51, p < .001, and Trails B, r(41) = .34, p = .024. Trails A is thought to 
measure processing speed while Trails B is thought to measure processing speed along with 
executive function. Therefore these correlations suggests that as processing speed and executive 
function declines, so does the ability to encode a representation that supports simple recognition 
of repeat items. No significant correlation was found between the measure of inhibition and 
intercepts. Participants slopes were significantly negatively correlated with time on Trails A, 
r(41) = -.67, p < .001, Trails B, r(41) = -.61, p < .001, and the measure of inhibition, r(41) = -.49, 
p < .001. The same pattern of results was found when using lure trial performance such that a 
significant correlation was found between lure trial performance and time on Trails A, r(41) = -
.33, p = .03, Trails B, r(41) = -.43, p = .004, and the measure of inhibition, r(41) = -.43, p = .004. 
These correlations with slopes and lure trial performance suggest that processing speed, 
executive function, and inhibition correlate strongly the ability to PS. As processing speed, 
executive function, and inhibition decline, so does the ability to efficiently PS.  
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A similar pattern of results was found for intercepts, slopes, and lure trial performance in 
the divided attention condition. Participants intercepts were significantly positively correlated 
with time on Trails A, r(41) = .30, p = .049, but not on Trails B or the measure of inhibition, p’s 
> .322. The significant relationship between Trails A and intercepts aids in explaining why 
memory performance was significantly worse in this condition. Performance in the divided 
attention task heavily relied upon the ability to quickly make a judgment about two numbers and 
then try to remember the object, therefore, as processing speed increases, so does one’s ability to 
make the judgment and engage with the object long enough to form a memory that supports 
old/new recognition. Participants slopes were significantly negatively correlated with time on 
Trails A, r(41) = -.61, p < .001, Trails B, r(41) = -.56, p < .001, and the measure of inhibition, 
r(41) = -.46, p = .002. When using overall lure trial performance, a significant negative 
correlation was found between overall lure trial performance and time on Trails A, r(41) = -.43, 
p = .004, Trails B, r(41) = -.33, p = .033, but not the measure of inhibition, r(41) = -.25, p = .100. 
Significant relationships were still found in the divided attention portion of the task; however, 
they were noticeably weaker than the correlations found in the full attention condition. This 
suggests that while memory processes were still able to operate to some extent under divided 
attention, the divided attention condition impaired the ability to sufficiently engage with the 
materials and form mnemonic representations. 
3.2.2 Discussion 
 Reductions in cognitive resources occur as individuals age (Craik, 1983). A reduction in 
the amount of attentional or working memory resources may cause a bottleneck in the 
engagement of simultaneous processes. Encoding complex stimuli, such as remembering all of 
the features of a stimulus, requires the deployment of cognitive resources, both for generating 
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novel connections that are specific to that particular object (e.g., this particular house is blue, has 
a door on the left side of the house, and has a bay window on the right side), as well as deploying 
a particular strategy that will aid in the memory of that object (e.g., this house is blue and I can 
only see a little bit of a window on the left side of the house). The latter strategy would be 
particularly helpful given that the current task required the discernment of rotation. However, the 
former approach would also help to build a highly detailed memory of the object. If fewer 
resources are available to operate on a stimulus, then the ability to engage in both processes 
would be impaired, and on average, a weaker representation would be stored leading to deficits 
in memory later on. Based on these ideas and the results of a substantial amount of research (e.g., 
Craik & McDowd, 1987; Kim & Givoanello, 2012), it was hypothesized that reducing the 
availability of resources in YAs, through a relational divided attention task, would cause memory 
performance to mirror that of OAs.  
 The current experiment elicited results supporting the notion that a reduction in 
attentional resources impacts pattern separation processes. The slope across degrees of rotation, 
as revealed by the multilevel model, shows that YAs’ performance improved at a similar rate 
under divided attention conditions, as OAs’ under full attention conditions. This finding, 
however, should be interpreted with caution. Despite the fact that YAs under divided attention 
improved at similar rates to OAs under full attention, it is quite possible that this reduction in the 
rate of improvement arose from increased intercepts. Since YAs under divided attention are 
about 20% worse at indicating an object is an exact repeat, the possible rate of increase across 
degrees of rotation is severely limited. Support for this idea is found in a marginally significant 
relationship between intercepts and slopes, z = -1.72, p = .086. The relationship suggest that as 
intercepts increase, slopes decrease. This, in combination with the significantly impaired 
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performance under the divided attention condition, provides evidence that the similar slopes are 
due to different underlying mechanisms. 
One argument against this interpretation is that OAs’ rate of improvement was even 
worse in the divided attention manipulation, as compared to YAs’ in the divided attention 
condition. This result suggests that the decrease in YAs’ rate of improvement under divided 
attention may reflect a similar underlying process as OAs, such as alterations in PS. If this 
possibility were the primary underlying factor, then we could conclude that PS processes are 
impacted by the ability to deploy an efficient strategy to encode materials, or by the ability to 
deploy resources in the generation of connections within a stimulus, or both. This conclusion 
would be significant in the pattern separation literature as researchers often, in an attempt to 
more closely mirror the tasks used in the rodent literature, investigate pattern separation using 
incidental encoding paradigms (e.g., Lacy, Yassa, Stark, Muftuler, & Stark, 2011; Motley & 
Kirwan, 2012; Reagh & Yassa, 2014).  If the deployment and availability of attentional resources 
can impact the PCB in aging, then this would suggest that intentional and effortful encoding 
operations have a measurable impact on PS. While this would be a novel and important finding 
for the PS literature, it cannot be known with certainty as to whether the decrease in the rate of 
improvement is mediated by the same processes that reduces OAs’ rate of improvement, or, 
whether there is simply a ceiling effect on the rate of improvement.  
The divided attention manipulation does, however, highlight the critical nature of 
attentional resources during the encoding of complex pictorial stimuli. Performance overall was 
dramatically worse for both YA and OA participants when they encoded the objects while 
making a number judgment, and this change in performance was greater than anticipated. The 
attentional manipulation used in the current study has been employed in prior research, and, in 
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that study, had the effect of matching performance between YAs in the divided attention 
condition and OAs in the full attention condition (Kim & Giovanello, 2011). However, the prior 
study used word pairs rather than complex color photographs. It is possible that when a 
participant need only to encode words, the relatively simple nature of the stimuli can be stored in 
working memory and operated on even while engaging in the secondary task. For the current 
study, it appears that the primary task required more resources than were allowed by the 
simultaneous secondary task, and therefore, a mnemonic representation strong enough to support 
fine detailed memory discrimination was not formed. The results do indicate, however, that the 
formation of a strong episodic memory relies on the ability to deploy attentional resources to the 
to-be-remembered object, which is not a novel finding.  
Future studies that investigate the role of attention on the PCB in aging should implement 
a divided attention task that taxes attention in a different way. One way to alter the divided 
attention task would be to make it easier. This might involve an odd/even number discrimination 
such that participants do not have to look at two locations on the screen, or it may involve a tone 
counting task so participants never have to move their eyes away from the to-be-encoded object. 
These options would make the divided attention task easier, yet they would not tax relational 
attention in the way that is hypothesized in the current study. Therefore, a divided attention task 
in which participants compared two tones by indicating which is higher would allow for the 
taxing of relational attention, while also not requiring participants to move their eyes. In this 
scenario, it is possible that support for the role of attentional resources as they relate to the PCB 
in aging would be found. 
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3.3 Experiment 3 - Inhibition deficit and the completion bias 
A deficiency in inhibitory processing has not been explored directly as an explanation for 
age-related changes in PS abilities. Toner et al. (2009), however, assessed whether there were 
correlations between cognitive measures of inhibition (e.g., the inhibition and 
inhibition/switching subtests from a standardized neuropsychological instrument, tasks much like 
the Stroop task) and OA performance for correctly identifying lure trials. The only relationship 
found was a marginally significant relationship between inhibition and lure trial performance, r = 
-.39, p = .09.  Further, Stark et al. (2010) presented both OAs and YAs with a spatial PS task, but 
presented 10 study/test lists with only 10 items in each study session. Interestingly, OAs as a 
group exhibited no deficit in spatial PS as compared to YAs, despite the fact that impairments 
have been found in other spatial PS tasks using larger sets of to-be remembered items (Reagh et 
al., 2014). Not surprisingly, YAs show no significant changes in performance when the set size 
being tested is altered; however, this specific manipulation has not been tested in OAs (Stark et 
al., 2015). These results suggest that part of the PCB in aging may come from the inability to 
inhibit previously learned information while encoding information encountered later. 
For the purposes of the current study, I focus on the possibility that OAs are less able to 
clear the contents of working memory and, therefore, experience greater proactive interference 
than YAs. Zacks et al. (2000) refer to this mechanism as deletion, or the ability to remove prior 
representations from memory to efficiently focus on the current goals. The inability to clear old 
representations from working memory during encoding leads to “mental clutter” and impairs the 
ability to focus on the particular goal at hand. Zacks, Radvansky, & Hasher (1996) studied this 
mechanism with a directed forgetting paradigm. In this study, participants were presented with 
words. After the presentation of a word, participants were told to either forget the word or 
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remember the word for a later test. Across several experiments it was shown that OAs have an 
impaired ability to suppress or delete information that they were told to forget, demonstrating 
less of a difference between to-be-remembered versus to-be-forgotten words at test as compared 
to YAs (Zacks et al., 1996).  
 To test this prediction, the current experiment adopted methods from the directed 
forgetting paradigm used by Zacks et al. (1996). Participants were given specific instructions 
about the nature of the study episode. They were told that they should study each object, but that 
after the presentation of each object, a letter would appear on the screen, either an “R” or an “F”. 
If they saw an “R” they were to remember that object for the later test. If they saw an “F” they 
were to forget that object. They were also told that forgetting the to-be-forgotten objects would 
aid in their memory for the to-be-remembered objects. These instructions were used as a way to 
additionally motivate their forgetting. The letter that indicated whether they were to remember or 
forget an object was displayed for 1.5 sec after the presentation of the object and followed by a 
0.5 sec inter-stimulus interval. The directed forgetting manipulation was used on an item-by-item 
basis, was split evenly between the studied stimuli, and was implemented randomly so that 
participants would not able to predict which objects would go on to be remembered versus 
forgotten. Therefore, participants were forced to attend to each object equally before the 
remember or forget instructions appeared. 
 An item-by-item directed forgetting paradigm was specifically chosen because the 
paradigm implemented in this experiment required the use of a recognition test. List-wide 
directed forgetting paradigms tend to only find effects on recall and not recognition (Geiselman, 
Bjork, & Fishman, 1983), while item directed forgetting paradigms tend to elicit impairments in 
both recall and recognition (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Zacks et al., 1996). This 
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difference is thought to occur because list-wide directed forgetting impairs processes that support 
memory retrieval, whereas item directed forgetting alters processing occurring at encoding. List-
wide directed forgetting impairs retrieval, specifically recall, due to retrieval inhibition or 
through a mental context shift (Sahakyan & Kelley, 2002), but leaves recognition intact because 
the same operations that support recognition occur for both the to-be-forgotten list and the to-be-
remembered list. Item directed forgetting impairs recognition either through the suppression of 
rehearsal or through the suppression of elaboration on the item, both processes that occur at 
encoding (Basden et al., 1993). Importantly, this experiment attempted to isolate cognitive 
operations occurring at encoding (e.g., the inability of OAs to efficiently delete the contents of 
working memory), and thus, directed forgetting at the item level was chosen. 
 Zacks et al. (1996), using an item method directed forgetting paradigm, found that words 
in the to-be-forgotten condition were recognized to the same extent for both OAs and YAs, while 
items in the to-be-remembered condition were recognized significantly more by YAs. This 
finding suggests that OAs are less able to efficiently clear the contents of working memory to 
support later episodic memory. Interestingly, prior research using an item method directed 
forgetting paradigm has shown that the difference between recognition rates, while still 
significant, is greatly reduced when using pictures (Hauswald & Kissler, 2008). This observation 
is interpreted as an advantage for the current study given that altering the tuning curve (yet 
leaving the anchors largely intact) will improve the interpretability of the results. Large 
decrements in old/new recognition bring into question whether the differences in performance 
for rotated trials is due to PS or due to impairments in the formation of a memory in general. 
Based on these studies and the general theory of the inhibitory deficit, it was predicted that there 
would be an interaction between age, instructions, and similarity, both in the old/new recognition 
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vs. lure discrimination index and in the tuning curve analysis. As such, OAs’ performance across 
the different degrees of rotation would be similar despite the instructions to forget or remember 
stimuli. Young adults, however, were predicted to show a bias to PC for the objects that were to-
be-forgotten and maintain their ability to efficiently notice small changes in stimuli for to-be-
remembered objects, or pattern separate.  
3.3.1 Results 
3.3.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-five YAs and 25 OAs completed the experiment. One YA was removed from the 
analysis due to chance level performance. The OA participants were significantly more educated, 
t(47) = -10.84, p < .001. Again, the OAs were also slower to perform Trails A, t(47) = -4.76, p < 
.001, Trails B, t(47) = -3.89, p < .001, color naming time, t(47) = -3.86, p < .001, word reading 
time, t(47) = -4.57, p < .001, and color-word interference time, t(47) = -5.79, p < .001. As a more 
direct measure of inhibition, we subtracted the color naming time from the color-word 
interference time. This measure was also significantly different between OAs and YAs, t(47) = -
5.49, p < .001, suggesting that OAs in the current sample had reduced inhibitory processes. 
There were no other group differences. See Table 5 for means and standard errors of all the 
cognitive measures collected. 
3.3.1.2 Old/New Recognition and the overall lure discrimination index 
 Recognition and overall lure discrimination index scores were calculated for each group 
and within each directed forgetting condition. These scores were analyzed with a 2(Group: 
Younger vs. Older) x 2(directed forgetting: remember vs. forget) x 2(Memory type: old/new 
recognition vs. lure discrimination index) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a main effect 
of memory type, F(1,47) = 267.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .85, such that old/new recognition was 
55 
significantly better than lure discrimination. There was no main effect of group, F(1,47) = 1.14, p 
= .291, ηp2 = .02, and no main effect of the directed forgetting manipulation, F(1,47) = 1.52, p = 
.224, ηp2 = .03. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between the directed 
forgetting manipulation and group, F(1,47) = 7.46, p = .009, ηp2 = .14, indicating that YAs 
exhibited better memory in the remember condition (M = .50, SD = .13) as compared to the 
forget condition (M = .46, SD = .12), whereas OAs showed essentially no difference in 
performance between the remember (M = .44, SD = .10) and forget conditions (M = .45, SD = 
.09). Interestingly, there was no effect of memory type and group, F(1,47) = 2.17, p = .147, ηp2 = 
.04, and no significant three-way interaction between directed forgetting, memory type, and 
group, F(1,47) = 2.31, p = .135, ηp2 = .05, although both trended toward significance.  
Since this result fails to replicate an OA impairment in lure discrimination, I examined 
the pattern of behavior within each directed forgetting condition between groups. For the 
remember trials only, there was a marginally significant interaction between memory type and 
group, F(1,47) = 3.66, p = .062, ηp2 = .07, indicating that OAs exhibited the typical impairment 
in lure discrimination as compared to YAs. For the forgotten trials there was no significant 
interaction between memory type and group, F(1,47) = .62, p = .434, ηp2 = .01, indicating that 
the difference between old/new recognition and lure discrimination was similar between the two 
groups. To understand whether the lack of a significant three-way interaction in the full model 
was due to a power issue, a post-hoc power analysis was run. The observed power for the 
interaction between group, directed forgetting, and memory type was β = .319. While the three-
way interaction was not significant in the full model, the combination of a marginally significant 
interaction between group and memory type in the remember condition, the lack of a significant 
interaction between group and memory type in the forget condition, and the low power observed 
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in the full model, suggests that OAs do exhibit a decline in lure discrimination and that YAs do 
successfully inhibit memory encoding in the forget condition (see Figure 10).  
3.3.1.3 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – repeated measures ANOVA 
 Before running the analyses, I checked to ensure that the rates of responding “new” were 
similar between the two groups. No significant differences were found in rates of “new” 
responses to trials that were not encountered at study, nor to old or rotated trials, all p’s > .357. A 
2(Group: YA vs. OA) x 2(Directed forgetting: remember vs. forget) x 5(Degree of rotation: 
repeat - 55°) repeated measures ANOVA with group as a between subjects factor and directed 
forgetting and degree of rotation as within subjects factor was used to analyze performance 
across the degrees of rotation. There was a significant main effect of rotation, F(1,47) = 109.91, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .70, indicating that performance improved as the degree of rotation increased. 
There was no significant main effect of directed forgetting, F(1,47) = 1.01, p = .320, ηp2 = .02, 
and no significant main effect of group, F(1,47) = 2.27, p = .138, ηp2 = .05. There was a 
marginally significant interaction between directed forgetting and group, F(1,47) = 2.88, p = 
.096, ηp2 = .06, such that OAs exhibited a small benefit for forget trials and YAs exhibited a 
small benefit for remember trials, and a significant three-way interaction between group, directed 
forgetting, and degree of rotation, F(4,188) = 2.79, p = .028, ηp2 = .06. No other effects were 
significant, all p’s > .395 (see Figure 11). A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
independently at each degree of rotation to better understand the factor mediating the three-way 
interaction. A significant group by directed forgetting interaction was found at 25° of rotation, 
F(1,47) = 5.47, p = .024, ηp2 = .10, such that YAs in the remember condition outperformed OAs 
in the remember condition, while performance was equivalent in the forget condition. A 
marginally significant effect of group was found at 35° of rotation, F(1,47) = 3.33, p = .074, ηp2 
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= .07, and at 55° of rotation, F(1,47) = 3.96, p = .052, ηp2 = .08, in favor of YAs. The general 
pattern across the data was that YAs tended to exhibit a benefit in their mnemonic performance 
on remember vs forgotten trials, whereas OAs exhibited little difference between remembered 
and forgotten trials (see Figure 12). 
3.3.1.4 Lure discrimination index results across all trials – Multilevel Model 
 A multilevel model was used to analyze the lure discrimination index across all trials. 
The final model was built through likelihood ratio tests. The ICC for this experiment was .15, 
thus 15% of the variance came from between-subjects as opposed to within subjects. A 
likelihood ratio test between a model without a quadratic term and a model with a quadratic term 
revealed a significant improvement in fit when adding a quadratic effect χ2(4) = 15.7, p = .003. 
The quadratic effect was also significant t(439) = -2.86, p = .005; however, the estimate of the 
effect was -.0098. This indicates that the linear effect decreased in steepness about 1% for each 
increased degree in rotation. In light of this finding, I opted to leave the quadratic term out of the 
final model for consistency across experiments, as well as for parsimony in the model. For 
completeness, however, I ran all of the final models with and without a quadratic effect and the 
pattern of results was unchanged. I also tested to determine if a different variance estimate for 
each group improved model fit and found a non-significant improvement in fit, χ2(4) = 5.3, p = 
.258. The final model reported is a linear model with random intercepts and random slopes with 
a between subjects effect of group and within subjects effects of degree of rotation and directed 
forgetting.  
 The model revealed no significant effect of group, t(47) = -.33, p = .742, no significant 
effect of directed forgetting, t(435) = .33, p = .740, and no significant interaction between group 
and directed forgetting, t(435) = .22, p = .824. Therefore, neither the directed forgetting 
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manipulation nor age, had an effect on the ability to respond “old” to trials that were exact 
repeats. There was a significant effect of rotation, t(435) = 10.64, p < .001, however it did not 
interact with any other factors, all p’s > .117. See Table 6 for parameter estimates of the effects. 
The result of the multilevel model suggests that both groups in both conditions performed 
similarly across degrees of rotation. 
3.3.1.5 Rotation Test 
 For this experiment I again ran three comparisons between YAs and OAs ability to 
discriminate between rotated and non-rotated objects. Younger adults and OAs were not 
significantly different in their ability to indicate an object that was an exact repeat was “old”, 
t(47) = .43, p = .669. Younger adults and OAs were also not significantly different in their ability 
to indicate a rotated object was “rotated”, t(47) = .49, p = .630, and not significantly different in 
their overall performance in indicating whether objects were rotated or not, t(47) = .68, p = .501. 
Overall YAs (M = .84, SD = .06) performance was very similar to OAs (M = .83, SD = .07). 
Since there were no group differences in the ability to discriminate rotation in this experiment no 
follow up analyses were conducted. 
 It is not clear why performance on the rotation test was significantly different in the prior 
two experiments but not in the current experiment. Accuracy on the rotation test was consistently 
around the low to mid 80% for OAs in all three experiments. Younger adults, however, 
performed at 90% in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, but were only 84% accurate in the 
current experiment. Since the rotation test used in the current set of experiments is not a standard 
test, it cannot be known what performance in the population should be. Therefore, no claims may 
be made about whether the YAs in the first two experiments were performing abnormally high, 
or whether YAs in the third experiment were performing abnormally low. Despite the different 
59 
findings across experiments, the results of the mnemonic similarity task used in all three 
experiments were unchanged when controlling for performance on the rotation task. This 
suggests that the rotation task, which should tax short term memory processes, is measuring a 
different cognitive process than the ones taxed by the mnemonic similarity task. Moreover, 
differences in the rotation task in Experiment 1 and 2 were found for rotated and repeat trials, 
while repeat trial performance in the mnemonic similarity task was consistently found to be the 
same. Again, this suggests that differences in rotation task performance between OAs and YAs 
were caused by a different underlying process. 
3.3.1.6 Individual differences in the lure discrimination index 
 For this experiment I ran correlations between lure trial performance, as indexed by the 
average lure trial performance, as well as the model implied intercepts in slopes in both the 
remember and forget trials. All participants were included in all correlations. The only 
significant correlation was between the measure of inhibition and the slopes in the remember 
trials, r(47) = -.35, p = .012. It is possible that the lack of correlations between performance and 
processing speed measures that were found in Experiment 1 and 2 were caused by the use of a 
different strategy to encode the materials in Experiment 3. Successful performance in 
Experiment 1 and 2 relied on quickly and efficiently forming a strong mnemonic representation. 
Because successful performance in the forgotten trials relies on not forming a strong mental 
representation until after the image is off the screen, one strategy would involve forming a gist 
representation while encoding the object, and then expanding on it only if you are told to 
remember the object. In this scenario, a faster processing speed would not necessarily benefit 
performance. 
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3.3.1.6 Discussion 
 It was hypothesized in this experiment that OAs, due to impaired inhibitory process, 
would show no effect of the directed forgetting manipulation, while YAs would show reduced 
memory when instructed to forget objects. Based on the results, I conclude that the directed 
forgetting manipulation had measurable impacts only on YAs performance, and therefore, that 
reduced inhibitory processes do impact pattern separation processes; however, it should be noted 
that the results are not consistent across all analysis strategies. 
 The most compelling evidence that YAs are able to inhibit what has just been 
encountered, and therefore reduce the strength of the encoded representation, comes from the 
lure discrimination index across all degrees of rotation that was analyzed with a repeated 
measures ANOVA. In this analysis the critical three way interaction was found. After 
investigating the differences in performance within each rotation type, and as can be seen in 
Figure 12, YAs tend to exhibit an increase in performance, relative to themselves, in the 
remember condition, whereas OAs show no benefit for remember trials. In the analysis of 
old/new performance, versus the overall lure trial index, a trend toward a three-way interaction 
was found. Follow up analyses indicated that all of the results were in the hypothesized direction 
(i.e., impairments in performance for OAs in the remember trials as compared to YAs, and a 
reduction in YA performance in the forgotten trials that mimics the performance of OAs); 
however, there was not enough power in the data set to fully support the finding. Lastly, the 
multilevel approach found no significant changes in performance either between groups or 
between the directed forgetting manipulation. However, caution is warranted in drawing strong 
conclusions from the multilevel approach because of the non-linearity within this particular data 
set. There was a significant quadratic effect, although the results were unchanged when 
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implementing a quadratic term, which provides evidence the data are not well represented by a 
straight line. To follow up on this idea I ran a model with a cubit term to see if that improved 
model fit and found a marginally significant improvement in model fit, χ2(5) = 9.4, p = .094, 
again suggesting the data is simply not appropriate for a model that assumes consistent changes 
across trials. In sum, a repeated measures ANOVA is the most appropriate way to analyze this 
data set due to the fact that it makes no assumptions about how the change across degree of 
rotation should occur. The repeated measures ANOVA also provided consistent evidence that 
YAs were able to engage cognitive processes that suppressed memory formation when they were 
told to forget, whereas OAs were not able to do so. Thus, despite the limitations discussed above, 
there is sufficient evidence to support the idea that inhibitory processes are critical for efficient 
PS processes to take place. 
 Encoding memories not only requires the focus of attention on the to-be-remembered 
object, it also requires the ability to keep a clean mental workspace such that the to-be-
remembered object is not cluttered by irrelevant information. Mental clutter during encoding 
could occur because the object itself triggers irrelevant memories, or because previously 
encountered information is not efficiently cleared from the mental workspace. The latter 
mechanism is referred to as a deletion mechanism (Zacks et al., 2000). One line of inquiry 
suggests that OAs tend to have reduced digit span because they experience more proactive 
interference. When OAs are given the digit span not in order of increasing length they often 
perform at equivalent rates to YAs due to the fact that they have reductions in the deletion 
mechanism (e.g., Zacks et al., 2000). I hypothesized that, due to an impairment in the deletion 
mechanism, OAs would show no reductions in performance for trials they were instructed to 
forget, while YAs would show reductions in forgotten trials. The difference in performance 
62 
between trials that were to-be-remembered and trials that were to-be-forgotten lies in the ability 
to efficiently delete the contents of working memory when instructed to do so. Since YAs are 
better at clearing out the contents of working memory, they are better able to suppress encoding 
mechanisms and therefore see a reduction in memory when they are instructed to forget.  
 Evidence from this experiment extends the prior literature on the inhibitory deficit by 
providing evidence that the deletion mechanism is critical not only for simple recall and 
recognition, but also critically important for encoding a highly detailed representation. When 
investigating the old/new recognition and the overall lure discrimination index, YAs perform 
better for lure trials in the remember, versus forget, condition, whereas OAs’ performance was 
equivalent regardless of the instruction. Similarly, when investigating performance across lure 
trials with a repeated measures ANOVA, YAs tended to show better memory in the remember 
versus forgotten condition, whereas OAs did not. These differences were observed, despite the 
fact that old/new recognition was the same across both groups. Therefore, impairments in 
inhibitory processes, and specifically in the deletion mechanism, contribute to reductions in the 
fidelity of a mnemonic trace, even when the trace itself can support old/new recognition.  
This result is important for the inhibition literature because prior research tends not to 
find reductions in recognition memory during list wide directed forgetting (Geiselman, Bjork, & 
Fishman, 1983), while item directed forgetting leads to impairments in both recall and 
recognition (Basden, Basden, & Gargano, 1993; Zacks et al., 1996). List-wide directed forgetting 
effects recall, but not recognition, since list-wide directed forgetting impacts retrieval inhibition, 
a process that occurs at retrieval and not at encoding. The theory suggests that all the operations 
that take place at encoding are the same between the two lists (i.e., the to-be-forgotten list and to-
be-remembered list), it is simply what happens to the lists after encoding has taken place that 
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affects memory. Item directed forgetting tends to also disrupt recognition due to changes in 
rehearsal or elaboration mechanisms. While retrieval inhibition or a context shift may be the 
primary mechanisms behind recall deficits in list-wide directed forgetting, it is also possible that 
these mechanisms impact recognition when the decision process can only be guided by the fine 
details of the mnemonic trace. Retrieval inhibition, or a sudden context shift, may also serve to 
disrupt consolidation mechanisms that take place after an entire list is learned through rehearsal 
and elaboration suppression. Therefore, an unexplored possibility is that list-wide directed 
forgetting does impair recognition rates, however, it only impairs recognition processes that tax 
pattern separation. 
The results of the current experiment also extend the PS literature. Efficient PS relies on 
mechanisms that orthogonalize a neural code such that it can be encoded as novel, even when it 
overlaps with a previously encountered representation. However, the current results suggest that 
efficient PS is also reliant on the ability to maintain a clean mental workspace. In relation to the 
current experiment, if the previous trial’s trace could not be cleared from the contents of working 
memory, the current trial was likely to be an amalgam of two representations, leading to a 
weaker memory trace for the current trial and impaired PS. A clean mental workspace may 
therefore be a prerequisite to efficient PS processes. Evidence for this notion also comes from the 
correlation between the measure of inhibition and the individual slopes estimated from the 
remember trials. As the efficiency of inhibitory processes increase, so does PS as revealed by the 
mnemonic similarity task. Put another way, PS processes are the most effective in persons who 
can maintain a clean mental workspace by efficiently suppressing irrelevant information. 
Although we do not have direct evidence of this in OAs, OAs impairments in inhibitory 
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processes related to deleting irrelevant information are likely a major contributor to the PCB in 
aging.  
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Chapter 4: General Discussion 
 The primary goal of this study was to investigate how domain general cognitive 
processes altered by age influence the PCB. It has been argued by Stark and colleagues (2015) 
that the PCB in aging is caused solely by functional and anatomical changes in the hippocampus 
and, “cannot be overcome to improve performance on this task” (p. 14). The set of experiments 
tested this notion by manipulating different features of the typical mnemonic similarity task to 
assess whether or not domain general theories of cognitive aging may account for the PCB in 
aging.  
 My hypothesis for each study centered on the idea that domain general aspects of 
cognitive aging may contribute to the PCB in aging. Across the three experiments, the results 
primarily showed that that the PCB in aging does not operate in a vacuum, but rather, it may be 
modulated by other factors. More specifically, processing speed and inhibitory processes 
contribute to the PCB in aging. As we get older, the rate at which information is processed 
throughout the brain slows. As processing speed slows, so does the time it takes to form strong 
mnemonic representations. The results from Experiment 1 suggest that much of the memory 
function in OAs is retained, and that after accounting for the longer time needed to create a 
strong memory trace, memory performance is significantly improved. This is likely due to the 
limited time mechanism (Salthouse, 1996a). The limited time mechanism suggests that OAs’ 
reduced processing speed causes a reduction in the cognitive operations that can be performed 
when a task has a time constraint. In relation to the mnemonic similarity task, when OAs and 
YAs are given the same amount of time to form a robust, highly detailed memory of an object, 
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reductions in OAs’ processing speed causes a reduction in the ability to quickly interact with all 
the different features of the object, and therefore, they form a weaker, more gist based 
representation of the object. Also, based on the results of Experiment 1, the PCB in aging is not 
likely to be caused by the simultaneity mechanism. In this case, products of earlier cognitive 
operations are degraded by the time they are needed for later operations. If the simultaneity 
mechanism were a contributor to the PCB in aging, then the manipulation used in Experiment 1 
(i.e., giving OAs longer time to encode materials) would have exacerbated the PCB. Similarly, 
giving YAs less time may have also improved performance, whereas YAs in Experiment 1 
performed much more like OAs under a traditional speed condition. Therefore, more time, not 
less, improves memory performance for both OAs and YAs, providing evidence that PS relies on 
participants having sufficient time to form a robust mnemonic representation. 
Reductions in processing speed are directly related to the ability to efficiently pattern 
separate, a process supported by hippocampal function. It is likely that processing in the occipital 
cortex – a part of the brain that processes visual information - is improved when OAs are given 
more time to encode the stimulus. The improved processing in occipital cortex then sends a more 
complete representation to the hippocampus where pattern separation processes efficiently 
encode the representation. This is one possibility, yet it is also possible that visual processing 
remains largely unchanged, and that the improvement in processing comes solely from more 
efficient PS in the hippocampus when the hippocampus has more time to process the 
representation. Alternatively it may be the case that some combination of these underlying 
factors. Regardless, it will be an important next step to examine how and where these 
manipulations alter neural processes that support memory. 
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 An impairment in OAs’ inhibitory processing also contributes to the PCB. Inhibitory 
processes are theorized to consist of a deletion mechanism, an access mechanism, and a restraint 
mechanism (Lustig, Hasher, & Zacks, 2007). Experiment 3 focused on OAs’ and YAs’ ability to 
delete previously encountered representations from the mental workspace by asking participants 
to forget some of the encountered objects. Efficient deletion of previously encountered material 
aids in keeping a clean mental workspace. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that PS acts on 
the representation being held in mind, even if that representation is an amalgam of two events. 
Therefore, it is likely that PS acts in a passive way to create a mnemonic trace of the cognitive 
operations that are occurring in that moment. If OAs are less able to hold in mind a single event, 
or are less able to delete a previous event, then the ability to create a mnemonic trace of that 
single event will be impaired.  Young adults exhibited the ability to minimize the processing of a 
stimulus once they were given the instruction to forget. Their performance for to-be-forgotten 
objects was similar to that of OAs’. Older adults exhibited no difference between to-be-
remembered and to-be-forgotten objects, suggesting the ability to clear out previously 
encountered information is impaired, and that a cluttered mental work space contributes to the 
PCB in aging. 
 Gazzaley, Cooney, Rissman, & D’Esposito (2005) instructed participants to view scenes 
and faces. Participants were told to ignore faces or scenes, and focus only on the non-ignored 
stimuli. Results showed that OAs were less able to inhibit activity in a part of the brain the 
selectively processes faces when they were told to ignore faces. The same result occurred for 
OAs who were told to ignore scenes. Future studies investigating the neural processes supporting 
deletion could use the mnemonic similarity task, but use scenes and faces. In this scenario, it 
would be possible to investigate how the forget instructions impact processing both outside and 
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within the hippocampus. If activity during the processing of to-be-remembered and to-be-
forgotten faces is similar for OAs, it would support the idea that OAs are less able to stop, or 
delete, a prior event from the processing stream. A similar result may also occur in the 
hippocampus, such that hippocampal activity is not reduced in the to-be-forgotten trials, 
suggesting that OAs are not able to inhibit the mechanisms that support memory, even when 
given the instruction to do so. Therefore, part of the PCB in aging would be mediated by a 
cluttered mental workspace, leading the hippocampus to process no longer relevant information 
and impair PS processes. 
 It will also be important for future studies to investigate the role of access and restraint in 
the PCB. Similar to deletion, impairments in OAs’ ability to prevent irrelevant information from 
entering the mental workspace may also be a contributor to the PCB. It is possible that as OAs 
and YAs encode objects, that OAs incidentally engage in mnemonic retrieval. For example, if an 
OA sees a picture of a tinker toy, they may be more likely to retrieve a memory of playing with a 
tinker toy as a child. While this may actually benefit simple old/new recognition through a 
generation or elaboration mechanism, it will likely impair memory for that specific object. The 
current to-be-encoded representation will necessarily compete with the retrieved memory of a 
similar object, and again, lead to a weaker trace of the current event. 
 There is no clear evidence that attentional resources, as measured and manipulated in 
Experiment 2, contribute to the PCB in the way it was hypothesized. The results show that 
attention is critical in the formation of memories in general, however the pattern of impairments 
in YAs does not match that of OAs under full attention. While this particular hypothesis needs 
more study, it is possible that the reduction of resources is not a significant contributor to the 
PCB in aging. I have discussed attentional resources in this study as the ability to generate 
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connections within the stimuli or to use strategic processing to guide memory encoding. The 
critical bottleneck in the formation of memories, however, is more likely what you are able to do 
with the resources, as opposed to the total amount of resources. The constraint may not be 
limited resources, but limitations on the processes one is able to execute on what is being held by 
these resources. Despite these possibilities, prior research has shown that impairments in 
attentional resources match memory performance remarkably well, and therefore, it is more 
likely that the task itself requires a great deal of our available resources and the divided attention 
task is too distracting. It will be important for future research to implement different strategies 
for dividing YAs’ attention such that performance on the primary task remains similar to 
performance under non-divided attention conditions.  
 It is also important to note that the present set of experiments found evidence that the 
PCB in aging can be moderated by task design, while Stark et al. (2015) did not find this result. 
The inconsistency in the results likely arose for several reasons. First, while their task alterations 
set out to assess whether the task itself contributed to the PCB in aging, they did not specifically 
set out to test whether domain-general processes could moderate the PCB. For example, Stark et 
al. 2015 manipulated the time allowed for decision making such that there were no time 
constraints when participants made a mnemonic judgment. While this directly assesses the role 
of processing speed on decision making, it does not assess the role of processing speed on 
encoding of the to-be-remembered information. Therefore, processing speed does have an impact 
on the PCB in aging, however, this impact is greater at encoding than retrieval. Second, while 
Stark et al. manipulated set size in YAs, they did not implement this manipulation in OAs. The 
set size of a memory task has been shown to contribute to OA impairments in memory such that 
increasing the set size causes greater proactive interference in OAs (Zacks et al., 2000). The 
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present study manipulated inhibition through directed forgetting, however, another way to assess 
the role of inhibition in OAs would be to manipulate the set size as Stark et al. (2015) did in 
YAs. It is possible that Stark and colleagues would have found evidence for reductions in the 
PCB in aging when accounting for inhibition if they had included OAs in this experiment. In 
sum, it is likely that Stark et al. 2015 did not find that task design manipulations moderated the 
PCB in aging because they did not test a sufficient number of task parameters. 
 Finally, it is important to note that even though accounting for domain-general aspects of 
aging may improve memory performance in OAs and impair memory performance in YAs, the 
PCB in aging was still found in each experiment. Therefore, the conclusions of the present set of 
experiments should be stated clearly. As we age, PS processes that support episodic memory are 
altered such that OAs are more likely to pattern complete a similar, but novel episode. 
Processing speed and inhibitory processes that also change with age contribute to the PCB in 
aging and when taken into account, allow OAs to strengthen the memory formation process and 
reduce the PCB.  
4.1 Limitations 
There are several limitations that warrant discussion. First, the study of inhibition found 
mixed evidence to support the claim that inhibition is a contributor to the PCB in aging. The 
mixed evidence primarily came from a limitation in the power to find effects, but it also came 
from mixed results across analysis strategies. While I believe there is sufficient evidence despite 
these shortcoming to conclude that inhibition does contribute to the PCB, it will be important to 
replicate the key findings. One strategy would be to shorten the list of study materials and only 
use the overall lure discrimination index to try and strengthen the finding. This strategy alone 
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may ameliorate the power issues. Anecdotally, participants seemed to find this particular 
experiment more taxing than the others which may contribute to the weaker effect.  
Additionally, I adopted a within-subjects manipulation. There are many strengths to 
within-subjects designs, yet it would be important to know, for example, whether more time on 
study without the contrasting shorter study periods, would still improve memory function. It is 
possible that participants hone in on the increased study time and more effectively use the longer 
study periods. If they do not have exposure to shorter study periods, they may not use this extra 
time effectively and thus see a limited benefit. This would be important to know if you wanted to 
translate this into strategies OAs could adopt to aid in their memory performance.  
Another limitation to the current set of studies is the fact that I did not find a traditional 
“tuning” curve. This likely results from two things. First, I was not able to include any new trials 
in the actual analysis due to the fact that the new trials were not part of the within subjects design 
which eliminated one anchor of the curve. This is likely the primary cause to not consistently 
finding a non-linear effect due to the fact that the curve typically bows up or below the straight 
line between old and new trials. Second, in Experiment 3, non-linear and non-quadratic effects 
were found. Again this likely stems more from the somewhat more difficult nature of the third 
Experiment which may have contributed to the increased variability across degrees of rotation. 
Despite this, all studies use the difference between YAs and OAs as the measure of more or less 
PS and PC instead of the absolute bow of the line, and therefore, the interpretations would not 
change (e.g., Stark et al., 2010; Stark et al., 2015). 
Relatedly, some of the “old” anchor points were impacted by the different manipulations 
adopted in this study. These changes in the old anchor point were consistently small except for in 
Experiment 2. It is likely that the small changes in Experiment 1 and 3 come from pulling 
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performance off of floor. All studies that have investigated the PCB in aging have used around 
120 objects at study whereas I used around 190. This additional load on memory appears to have 
brought performance on the old trials up to around 30% where many studies find performance 
closer to 20% (e.g., Stark et al., 2010; Toner et al., 2009; Yassa et al., 2011a). In the current 
experiments performance on old trials was never better than 20% and, therefore, likely represents 
floor performance. Since performance on the standard task was slightly off floor, it left room for 
small improvements to appear at the old anchor. I do not believe that the small, but significant 
changes have an impact on the final conclusions drawn for the study. As can be seen in 
Experiment 2, performance on old trials can get much worse, so the small improvements seen in 
some conditions are not the cause of an increase rate of improvement. 
Lastly, the materials used in the current set of experiments were common objects in 
which the memory test centered on the ability to discriminate whether an object was rotated or 
not. While there is ample evidence that mental rotation abilities, as assessed with complex 3D 
objects and rotations along more than one axis, change with age (e.g., Jansen & Heil, 2010; 
Vandenberg & Kruse, 1978), there is also evidence to support the idea that simple objects and 
less complex changes in rotation (Cerella, Poon, & Fozard, 1981), as well as reduced time 
pressures when using complex 3D objects (Sharps & Gollin, 1987), eliminate age-related 
impairments in mental rotation. In two of the three experiments, there was evidence that YAs 
were better at the basic task of noticing rotation as compared to OAs. This result was unexpected 
given the single axis of rotation and the lack of a time constraint on the decision making process. 
It is possible that the way in which the rotation test was administered had an adverse impact on 
OAs ability to correctly respond. Namely, response options were increased such that during the 
rotation test, participants responded by indicating if the object was rotated by judging the degree 
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of rotation (as opposed to simply indicating rotated). This distinction may have made the task 
somewhat more difficult for OAs given the increased load of response options. Moreover, error 
rates were increased for rotated objects as well as for objects that were exact repeats. This 
suggests that it was not the ability to notice rotation per se that was altering performance. 
Interestingly, old/new recognition was not impaired in the mnemonic similarity task, and when 
rotation test performance was used as a covariate in Experiments 1 and 2, the results remained 
the same. This again suggests that age differences in the rotation test were not representative of 
OAs’ ability to successfully notice small changes between an object being presented and one 
stored in memory.  
4.2 Conclusions 
Despite these limitations, the findings from this study support the claim that memory 
processes do not occur in a vacuum. This claim is not new. This study, however, moves closer to 
specifying what domain general-cognitive processes contribute to cognitive operations (i.e., PS 
and PC) that support memory formation. Ultimately this research suggests that processes 
occurring outside the hippocampus significantly alter the ability of the hippocampus to 
efficiently execute its functions. Hippocampal PS and PC, therefore, rely heavily on upstream 
cortical processing to operate effectively. According to Stark and colleagues, the PCB in aging 
cannot be overcome to improve memory performance (Stark et al., 2015). The results within 
these experiments reveal a much more complex picture of aging. As we age, a myriad of changes 
occur that lead to a variety of bottlenecks in cognitive processing. Whether it is cognitive 
slowing or changes in inhibitory processes, altered memory is not solely caused by altered 
hippocampal function. Bottlenecks exist throughout the brain and these bottlenecks cause a 
reduction in the fidelity of the information that is sent to the hippocampus. Extra-hippocampal 
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bottlenecks, such as limitations on processing under time constraints, combine with impairments 
in PS and PC processes, and lead to the PCB in aging. While the current findings also provide 
evidence for the idea that the PCB in aging cannot be fully overcome, they indicate that the 
typical mnemonic similarity task measures more than just memory changes associated with age. 
Since the goal of the mnemonic similarity task is to specifically tap into PS processes, the task 
itself needs to be modified to accommodate other processing deficits that occur with age. These 
accommodations will likely be even more critical when understanding how PS processes are 
altered in pathological aging such as early Alzheimer’s disease.   
This set of experiments provides compelling evidence that the PCB in aging is a 
combination of complex factors that occur throughout the human brain. This set of experiments 
does not, however, elucidate what neural processes are altered by the manipulations. For 
example, when we account for processing speed by giving OAs more time to study the materials 
and form stronger memories, the question remains as to what neural regions support the 
formation of stronger memories. I have argued throughout this dissertation that the 
manipulations alter processing upstream to the hippocampus, however, it is also possible that the 
manipulations used in this study specifically alter hippocampal function. When participants are 
given more time to study the materials, upstream processing in the occipital cortex may be 
increased, creating a stronger representation that will then be sent to the hippocampus. Similarly, 
the ability to inhibit irrelevant information from entering the mental workspace may enhance 
processing through the reduction of mental clutter. An alternate possibility, however, is that 
hippocampal PS alone is improved such that PS is able to create a unique mnemonic trace when 
given more time. While it is most likely a combination of these factors, understanding how the 
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alterations in the PCB in aging found in this study are mediated by neural processes will be a 
critical next step. 
Finally, the results of the present study suggest that memory changes associated with age 
can be moderated and that it may be possible to implement strategies in OAs to reduce memory 
dysfunction. This is an important finding since much of our population is aging. Cognitive 
training with the goal of improving domain-general cognition has recently become the focus of a 
great deal of research. The present findings suggest that OAs may already have the requisite 
cognitive abilities to improve their memory performance; however, they may need to be given 
appropriate strategies to realize these improvements. Based on the processing speed 
manipulation (Experiment 1), it is plausible that if OAs were instructed to slow down when 
trying to encode and simply spend more time studying the material, that they would recover 
much of their memory abilities. Similarly, when designing technological interfaces for the 
public, it is likely that the user experience for OAs would be improved if the rate of presentation 
was slowed to allow for a more complete processing of each bit of information. Further, given 
OA deficits in inhibition, one strategy that may improve memory and cognition in general, would 
be to instruct OAs to learn new materials in smaller chunks. For example, if an OA is attempting 
to remember how to operate a new program on a computer, they may be able to learn more 
quickly if they break the learning into small portions. Learning may be improved in this scenario 
through the reduction of proactive interference. Since OAs have impairments in the deletion 
mechanism, their ability to discriminate between similar events that occur at different times in a 
long sequence of events would be impaired in relation to YAs. Learning in smaller chunks would 
help to keep a clean mental workspace, and therefore, allow OAs to build stronger 
representations of each stage of the process and improve learning and memory. It will be 
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important for future research to investigate whether teaching OAs strategies related to 
overcoming domain-general cognitive changes will actually improve learning and memory. 
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Figure 1. Results from a mnemonic similarity task showing the altered “tuning curve” that occurs 
in healthy aging (A) and in mild cognitive impairment (MCI, B). Note that in the anchor point 
for new trials is not the same across all groups (B), however the interpretation remains 
unchanged (Figure adapted from Stark et al., 2013)
A. B. 
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Figure 2. Example stimuli. During encoding participants will be shown a continuous stream of 
objects (top row). During test, participants will be shown stimuli that are either “old” (exact 
repeats of previously seen stimuli), “new” (objects never seen before), or “rotated” (objects that 
are rotated from the original presentation to varying degrees), and make “old”, “rotated”, or 
“new” judgments. As a note, a “new” image is not presented in the figure however, there will be 
an equal number of “old”, “rotated”, and “new” stimuli at test. 
 
 
 
 
79 
Table 1. 
Experiment 1 Demographic and Cognitive Testing Data 
 YA  OA 
N 25  25 
Gender 12m/13f  7m/18/f 
Age 19.08(.29)*  69(1.17) 
Education 12.8(.22)*  17.88(1.17) 
Mini Mental State Exam 29.68(.11)  29.4(.18) 
Digit span - forward 11.16(.41)  10.8(.47) 
Digit span - backward 7.36(.45)  7.28(.47) 
Trails A (sec) 20.48(.87)*  34.36(3.21) 
Trails B (sec) 49.16(3.10) *  87.80(12.11) 
D-KEFS Color-Word 
interference test 
   
     Color naming 24.52(.83) *  30.48(1.24) 
     Word reading 19.44(.75) *  22.0(.89) 
     Interference 41.48(1.53) *  58.8(2.95) 
Note: YA = Younger adult. OA = Older adult.  Asterisks 
indicate a significant difference between groups, p < .05. 
Numbers represent means and (standard errors). 
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Table 2. 
Parameter Estimates (PE) from Experiment 1 
 
 
 One Minus the Probability of Old 
Fixed Effects PE SE p - value 
Intercept .307 .029 < .0001 
Rotation .117 .009 < .0001 
Group .037 .041 .3718 
ROP .068 .028 .0163 
Rotation x Group -.045 .013 .0004 
Rotation x ROP -.029 .012 .0136 
Group x ROP -.158 .040 < .0001 
Rotation x Group x ROP .063 .016 .0002 
Random Effects    
Intercept .011 .003 .0004 
Intercept/Slope -.001 .0008 .0960 
Slope .0003 .0002 .0860 
Note. ROP = Rate of Presentation, SE = standard error. 
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 old/new recognition and overall lure discrimination performance. YA = 
young adult. OA = older adult. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 4. Experiment 1 lure discrimination results across all trial types. YA = young adult. OA = 
older adult. Numbers represent rate of presentation in seconds. Error bars represent standard 
error of the mean. 
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Figure 5. Experiment 1 lure discrimination across all trial types. YA = young adult. OA = older 
adult. Numbers represent rate of presentation in seconds. Error bars represent standard error of 
the mean. 
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Figure 6. Model implied intercepts and slopes in Experiment 1. YA = young adult. OA = older 
adult. Numbers represent rate of presentation in seconds. The dotted lines indicate the model 
implied results in the “faster” condition for each group. The solid lines indicate the model 
implied results in the “slower” condition for each group. 
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Table 3. 
Experiment 2 Demographic and Cognitive Testing Data 
 YA  OA 
N 25  18 
Gender 10m/15f  6m/12f 
Age 20.04(.53)*  73.22(1.82) 
Education 13.48(.48)*  17.75(.48) 
Mini Mental State Exam 29.40(.16)  29.33(.23) 
Digit span - forward 10.80(.44)  10.33(.51) 
Digit span - backward 7.52(.43)  7.11(.52) 
Trails A (sec) 21.04(1.32)*  37.06(2.84) 
Trails B (sec) 49.08(2.99)*  81.50(7.51) 
D-KEFS Color-Word 
interference test 
   
     Color naming 24.00(.70)*  30.94(1.74) 
     Word reading 18.68(.73)*  22.17(.90) 
     Interference 42.72(2.04)*  60.17(3.08) 
Note: YA = Younger adult. OA = Older adult.  Asterisks 
indicate a significant difference between groups, p < .05. 
Numbers represent means and (standard errors). 
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Table 4. 
Parameter Estimates (PE) from Experiment 2 
 One Minus the Probability of Old 
Fixed Effects PE SE p - value 
Intercept .272 .032 < .0001 
Rotation .122 .009 < .0001 
Group .113 .050 .0281 
DA .212 .028 < .0001 
Rotation x Group -.062 .015 < .0001 
Rotation x DA -.043 .012 .0002 
Group x DA -.090 .044 .0407 
Rotation x Group x DA .028 .018 .1216 
Random Effects    
Intercept .016 .005 .0003 
Intercept/Slope -.002 .001 .0856 
Slope .0006 .0003 .0338 
Note. DA = Divided Attention, SE = standard error. 
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Figure 7. Experiment 2 results from old/new recognition and overall lure discrimination. FA = 
full attention. DA = divided attention. YA = young adult. OA = older adult. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 8. Experiment 2 Lure discrimination index across all trials. YA = young adult. OA = older 
adult. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 9. Experiment 2 Lure discrimination across all trials. FA = full attention. DA = divided 
attention. YA = young adult. OA = older adult. Error bar represent standard error of the mean. 
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Table 5. 
Experiment 3 Demographic and Cognitive Testing Data 
 YA  OA 
N 24  25 
Gender 7m/17f  10m/15f 
Age 18.67(.17)*  69.92(1.24) 
Education 12.54(.15)*  17.67(.51) 
Mini Mental State Exam 29.12(.25)  29.40(.16) 
Digit span - forward 11.08(.39)  10.76(.41) 
Digit span - backward 7.67(.44)  7.40(.49) 
Trails A (sec) 23.13(1.56)*  34.20(1.71) 
Trails B (sec) 51.58(2.80)*  78.72(6.27) 
D-KEFS Color-Word 
interference test 
   
     Color naming 24.33(.77)*  30.72(1.44) 
     Word reading 18.08(.48)*  22.32(.78) 
     Interference 39.42(1.29)*  61.64(3.55) 
Note: YA = Younger adult. OA = Older adult. sec = seconds.  
Asterisks indicate a significant difference between groups, p < 
.05. Numbers represent means and (standard errors). 
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Figure 10. Experiment 3 old/new recognition and overall lure discrimination index. YA = young 
adult. OA = older adult. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 11. Experiment 3 lure discrimination index across all trials. YA = young adult. OA = 
older adult. Error bars represent standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 12. Experiment 3 lure discrimination index across all trials. Forgotten trials were 
subtracted from Remember trials. Being positive on the scale indicates greater memory for 
remembered versus forgotten trials. YA = young adult. OA = older adult. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean. 
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Table 6. 
Parameter Estimates (PE) from Experiment 3 
  
 One Minus the Probability of Old 
Fixed Effects PE SE p - value 
Intercept .322 .033 < .0001 
Rotation .110 .010 < .0001 
Group .015 .046 .7421 
DF .010 .029 .7397 
Rotation x Group -.023 .015 .1177 
Rotation x DF -.008 .012 .4943 
Group x DF .009 .040 .8244 
Rotation x Group x DF .012 .016 .4858 
Random Effects    
Intercept .016 .004 .0001 
Intercept/Slope -.003 .001 .0163 
Slope .001 .0004 .0062 
Note. DF = Directed Forgetting, SE = standard error. 
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